Financial Stability Report. May 2017 by Banco de España
FINANCIAL STABILITY 
REPORT 
05/2017

FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT MAY 2017

FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT MAY 2017
The cut-off date of this report: 25 April 2017.
Reproduction for educational and non-commercial purposes 
is permitted provided that the source is acknowledged.
© Banco de España, Madrid, 2017
ISSN: 1696-3520 (online)
ABBREVIATIONS (*)
€   Euro
AIAF  Asociación de Intermediarios de Activos Financieros (Association of Securities Dealers)
ABCP Asset-backed commercial paper
ATA  Average total assets
BCBS  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
BIS  Bank for International Settlements
BLS  Bank Lending Survey
bn   Billions
bp   Basis points
BRRD Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive
CBE  Banco de España Circular
CBSO  Banco de España Central Balance Sheet Data Office
CCyB Countercyclical capital buffer
CCR  Banco de España Central Credit Register
CDO  Collateralised debt obligation
CDS  Credit Default Swap
CEBS  Committee of European Banking Supervisors
CEIOPS  Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors
CET1 Common equity Tier 1 capital
CIs  Credit institutions
CNMV  Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (National Securities Market Commission)
CPSS  Basel Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems
DIs  Deposit institutions
EAD  Exposure at default
EBA European Banking Authority
ECB  European Central Bank
EFSF European Financial Stability Facility
EMU  Economic and Monetary Union
EONIA Euro overnight index average
EPA Official Spanish Labour Force Survey
ESFS  European System of Financial Supervisors
ESM European Stability Mechanism
ESRB  European Systemic Risk Board
EU  European Union
FASB  Financial Accounting Standards Board
FLESB Forward-Looking Exercise on Spanish Banks
FROB  Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the Banking Sector
FSA  Financial Services Authority
FSAP  Financial Sector Assessment Program
FSB  Financial Stability Board
FSF Financial Stability Forum
FSR  Financial Stability Report
FVC  Financial vehicle corporation
GAAP Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
GDI  Gross disposable income
GDP  Gross domestic product
G-SIIs Global systemically important institutions
GVA  Gross value added
GVAmp  Gross value added at market prices
IASB International Accounting Standards Board
ICO  Instituto Oficial de Crédito (Official Credit Institute)
ID   Data obtained from individual financial statements
IFRSs  International Financial Reporting Standards
IMF  International Monetary Fund
INE National Statistics Institute
IOSCO  International Organization of Securities Commissions
ISDA International Swaps and Derivatives Association
JST Joint Supervisory Team
LGD  Loss given default
LTROs Longer-term refinancing operations
LTV  Loan-to-value ratio (amount lent divided by the appraised value of the real estate used as collateral)
(*) The latest version of the explanatory notes and of the glossary can be found in the November 2006 edition of 
the Financial Stability Report.
m   Millions
MiFID  Markets in Financial Instruments Directive
MMFs  Money market funds
NPISHs  Non-profit institutions serving households
NPLs  Non-performing loans
OFIs Other financial intermediaries
OMT Outright Monetary Transactions
OTC  Over the counter
PD  Probability of default
PER  Price earnings ratio
pp   Percentage points
RDL Royal Decree-Law
ROA  Return on assets
ROE  Return on equity
RWA  Risk-weighted assets
SCIs  Specialised credit institutions
SMEs  Small and medium-sized enterprises
SIV  Structured investment vehicle
SPV  Special purpose vehicle
SRI Systemic Risk Indicator
SSM Single Supervisory Mechanism
TA   Total assets
TARP  Troubled Asset Relief Program
TLTROs Targeted Longer-term Refinancing Operations
VaR  Value at risk
WTO  World Trade Organisation
ISO COUNTRY CODES
AT  Austria
BE  Belgium
BG  Bulgaria
BR  Brazil
CH  Switzerland
CL  Chile
CN  China
CY  Cyprus
CZ  Czech Republic
DE  Germany
DK  Denmark
EE  Estonia
ES  Spain
FI  Finland
FR  France
GB  United Kingdom
GR  Greece
HR  Croatia
HU  Hungary
IE  Ireland
IT  Italy
JP  Japan
LT  Lithuania
LU  Luxembourg
LV  Latvia
MT  Malta
MX  Mexico
NL  Netherlands
NO  Norway
PL  Poland
PT  Portugal
RO  Romania
SE  Sweden
SI  Slovenia
SK  Slovakia
TR  Turkey
US  United States
CONTENTS
 
1 1.1 External environment of the euro area  15
1.2 Financial markets in the euro area and in Spain 19
1.3 The macroeconomic environment in the euro area and in Spain 21
 2.1 Banking risks 25
2.2 Profitability 42
2.3 Solvency 49
 3.1 Analysis of systemic risks 57
3.2 Cyclical risks and macroprudential decisions  57
3.3 Systemically important institutions 60 
 Annex 1. Consolidated balance sheet 63
 Annex 2. Consolidated income statement 64
OVERVIEW 11
   MACROECONOMIC 
RISKS AND FINANCIAL 
MARKETS  15
2  BANKING RISKS, 
PROFITABILITY 
AND SOLVENCY 25
3  ANALYSIS AND 
MACROPRUDENTIAL 
POLICY 57
4  ANNEX 63

BANCO DE ESPAÑA 11 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, MAY 2017
OVERVIEW
After a relatively weak first half of the year in 2016, international economic activity increased 
in the second half, and this trend has continued into the opening months of 2017. However, 
the pace of growth remains subdued and much uncertainty surrounds the global 
macroeconomic outlook, owing mainly to the possible resurgence in protectionist positions 
in trade and in capital movements, and to a potentially swifter-than-expected normalisation 
of the US monetary policy stance. 
The Spanish economy continued growing at a brisk pace during the second half of 2016, 
with GDP posting a growth rate of 3.2% for the year as a whole. The information available 
on 2017 Q1 points to a continuation of this expansionary trend, with a quarter-on-quarter 
growth rate that might be somewhat higher than that observed during the closing months 
of last year. The latest Banco de España projections show a continuation of the expansion 
during 2017 and the two following years, albeit at a more moderate pace than in the past 
two years. These forecasts are not free from certain downside risks, linked mainly to 
factors stemming from the external environment.
On domestic and international financial markets, recent months have seen something of a 
pick-up in long-term interest rates, rises in equity prices, more markedly so in the case of 
bank shares, and declines in credit risk premia. These developments appear to be in 
response to brighter investor expectations about the outlook for global growth and less 
concern over the attendant risks.
Spanish deposit institutions have generally held on the trend shown in previous editions of 
the Financial Stability Report (FSR), with an annual 1.7% decline in 2016 in their consolidated 
assets owing principally to their domestic activity. Consolidated results for 2016 fell by 
21.2%, with the return on equity standing at 4.3%. Influencing these developments were 
diminished activity and the low-interest-rate environment, along with certain one-off factors 
that affected both domestic business (significant losses at the odd institution, regulatory 
changes in the coverage of foreclosed assets and higher legal costs) and international 
business (the depreciation of certain currencies). As stated in previous FSRs, fewer losses 
attributable to the downturn in loans and receivables (down 16.3% on the previous year) 
have, to some extent, allowed the reduction in results obtained to be offset, although a high 
volume of non-productive assets continues to bear adversely on profitability.
The solvency of Spanish banks remains above the regulatory minimum levels. Thus, the 
common equity tier 1 (CET1) capital ratio stood at 12.8% at end-2016, 16 basis points (bp) 
up on the 2015 figure. The changes over time show that, since 2013, the total regulatory 
capital ratio of Spanish deposit institutions has increased by almost 150 bp.
Set out on the next page are the main factors of risk to the stability of the Spanish financial 
system.
These three risk factors broadly coincide with those highlighted in the previous FSR, although 
the order of the risks has been altered, with the possible correction in asset prices taking second 
place in terms of significance. As discussed, these factors affect not only the Spanish financial 
system but also the other euro area banking systems, at the same time, they are interrelated, 
and the materialisation of any of them may lead to the activation of either of the other two.
1 Key developments
2 Risk factors
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Current low interest rates along with the limited volume of banking business significantly 
restrict Spanish deposit institutions’ income-generating capacity. Chart A shows the 
trend in recent years of net interest income on domestic business, and the decline in 
terms of the course of financial revenues and costs can be clearly seen. As evidenced, 
the return on asset-side components (revenues) has declined by more than 50% in the 
past five years, moving on a similar course to overall costs, taking the related margin to a 
historically low level.
The still-high volume of non-productive assets (NPLs and foreclosures) contributes to 
increasing the pressure on banks’ income statement (see Chart B for NPLs and Chart 2.12 
for foreclosures), although their progressive reduction, admittedly a consequence of the 
improved macroeconomic conditions and the lower interest burden associated with the 
low levels of interest rates, lessens the pressure which, via margins, is exerted on Spanish 
banks’ income statement. Recently, the increase in legal costs, as a result of a series of 
legal rulings, has prompted a rise in the significance of legal risk for Spanish banks.
Finally, the process of downsizing has continued, enabling the efficiency ratio of Spanish 
banks to hold at around 50%, placing them in a better relative position than other peer 
systems, although this has not sufficed to significantly raise the return on equity over the 
past year.
The recent course of prices on international financial markets appears to respond to 
agents’ greater optimism about the global macroeconomic outlook. These developments 
2.1  LOW PROFITABILITY 
OF BANKING BUSINESS
2.2  CORRECTION IN FINANCIAL 
ASSET PRICES
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Colours in the table are as follows: green denotes no risk, yellow is low risk, orange is medium risk and red is high risk. The time horizon for which these risks are 
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are partly linked to certain reforms announced by the new US administration. The reflection 
of this has been an increase in long-term interest rates, rises in listed share prices and 
declines in credit risk premia (see Charts C and D). In this respect, a slower-than-expected 
implementation, the non-approval of some of the measures announced, or the 
materialisation of any of the previously discussed risks, might trigger corrections in 
financial asset prices through the adverse impact on expectations of firms’ future earnings 
or of increases in risk premia. Likewise, long-term interest rates might rise if the pace of 
normalisation of US monetary policy were swifter than anticipated or if the term premia 
incorporated into these yields, which are still at historically low levels, were to increase. 
This potential rise in long-term yields might also trigger corrections in the prices of risk-
bearing assets.
If the correction in financial asset prices and/or the rise in long-term interest rates were 
abrupt, they might have an adverse effect on financial stability through several channels. 
First, there might be short-term losses in the value of financial intermediaries’ portfolios. 
Further, the financing conditions of the different productive sectors might worsen, although 
a steeper yield curve might benefit deposit institutions in the medium term.
In recent months economic activity has quickened in the advanced and emerging 
economies alike (albeit not evenly in the latter). However, the risks to the growth outlook 
are high. These include most notably, on one hand, those associated with the renewed 
rise in protectionist positions that might have adverse effects on global trade, and, on the 
other, a swifter-than-expected normalisation of US monetary policy. Such normalisation 
might lead to a hike in long-term interest rates, which might feed through to other 
economies and give rise to capital outflows from the emerging economies. In the euro 
area, uncertainty notably surrounds the Brexit negotiations and the outcome of several 
elections. The materialisation of any of these risks along with the uncertainty generated 
might exert negative effects on the Spanish economy or on others in which Spanish 
banks have significant exposures, potentially affecting the quality of their assets (see 
Charts E and F).
The foregoing risks are analysed in greater detail throughout this FSR with a view 
to showing their potential impact on the financial system, especially on the activity 
pursued by Spanish deposit institutions with particular attention to their profitability 
and solvency.
2.3  DOWNWARD REVISION 
OF THE GROWTH OUTLOOK 
FOR THE INTERNATIONAL 
AND SPANISH ECONOMIES
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Difference between the 10-year and the 3-month rate. The dotted lines represent the historical averages of the series from 01.01.2001.
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Chapter 3 describes the course of action, in terms of macroprudential policy, followed by 
the Banco de España recently. Specifically, a description is offered of the decisions relating 
to the determination of the countercyclical capital buffer level, and the initiatives pursued 
both with respect to identifying systemic institutions, and those bearing on the level of the 
capital surcharge (capital buffer) required of these institutions.
3  Analysis and 
macroprudential policy
SOURCES: Banco de España and Economic Policy Uncertainty.
a Average volatility of bond markets (MOVE), stock markets (VIX) and exchange rates for the dollar against the euro, yen and sterling.
b Index of Global Economic Policy Uncertainty (Global EPU Index).
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1  MACROECONOMIC RISKS AND FINANCIAL MARKETS
After relative sluggishness in the first half of 2016, economic activity rose in the second 
half of the year, in particular among the advanced economies, while the stability observed 
in the emerging economies as a whole masked considerably uneven developments from 
country to country (see Chart 1.1.A). Asia was notably dynamic, assisted by the stimulus 
measures in China and in certain other countries in the area, in contrast to the weakness 
still characterising Latin America. The economic indicators earlier this year, relating to both 
confidence and business activity, confirm this improvement in the world economy. Hence, 
the year 2017 has, for the first time in recent years, begun against a background of upward 
revisions in global GDP growth forecasts, especially in the case of the advanced economies. 
Inflation rates in the advanced economies have increased gradually (see Chart 1.1.B), in 
line with commodities prices, and a rise has also been observed in inflation expectations, 
although core inflation is still some distance off central banks’ objectives.
However, the uncertainty surrounding growth forecasts is very high. This is mainly due to 
the expected re-gearing of economic policies in the United States, towards a substantially 
more expansionary fiscal policy, which is expected to entail a swifter normalisation of the 
monetary policy stance, and with the adoption of protectionist measures that would affect 
both merchandise trade and movements of people and capital. These constraints on 
trade, migratory and capital flows, especially if they were replicated in other areas, might 
deeply affect the global growth outlook in the medium and long term. 
1.1  External environment 
of the euro area 
There are across-the-board 
signs in the advanced 
economies that economic 
activity is strengthening…
… but in a setting of greater 
global uncertainty owing 
to the expected changes in 
economic policies in certain 
developed countries…
SOURCES: Datastream, Bloomberg, IMF (WEO October 2016), Consensus Forecast and Banco de España.
GROWTH AND INFLATION INDICATORS CHART 1.1
0
1
2
3
4
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
 ADVANCED  EMERGING  GLOBAL
A  CONTRIBUTION TO GLOBAL GDP GROWTH
% y-o-y Forecasts
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
14 15 16 17 14 15 16 17 14 15 16 17 14 15 16 17
 TOTAL  TOTAL EXCLUDING TAXES
 UNDERLYING  CONSENSUS FORECASTS
B  CONSUMPTION PRICES
% y-o-y
United States Euro area United Kingdom Japan
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Jan-16 Mar-16 May-16 Jul-16 Sep-16 Nov-16 Jan-17 Mar-17
 BRAZIL  MEXICO  TURKEY  CHINA
D  2017 GROWTH FORECASTS FOR EMERGING ECONOMIES
% y-o-y
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Jun-16 Aug-16 Oct-16 Dec-16 Feb-17
 ONE IN JUNE 2017  THREE IN 2017
C  PROBABILITY OF RISES IN THE TARGET RANGE FOR THE FEDERAL 
FUNDS RATE IN 2017 
%
US
Elections
FOMC 
meeting 
Dec-16
FOMC 
meeting 
Mar-17
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 16 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, MAY 2017
The size, composition and timing of the fiscal stimulus package in the United States has 
admittedly not yet been defined. But the combination of a reduction in direct taxes, 
depending on who the main beneficiaries are, and an increase in spending on infrastructure 
would induce an expansionary impulse in the short term, with positive repercussions 
beyond the United States. Nonetheless, a series of factors might limit the favourable 
impact on activity. Among these, the high levels of public debt might significantly reduce 
the effect of a fiscal stimulus if they bear adversely on agents’ confidence and raise risk 
premia. Further, given the improvements in the US economy’s cyclical position, there can 
be no ruling out of crowding out effects on private demand and increases in inflation being 
countered with a tighter monetary policy. Indeed, market expectations about US policy 
interest rates have come into line with the projections of the FOMC (Federal Open Market 
Committee, entrusted with overseeing open market operations in the United States) and 
they discount three 25 bp increases in the policy interest rate during 2017, including the 
rise that took place in March (see Chart 1.1.C). 
Against this backdrop, the stability of the dollar and of US long-term interest rates over 
recent months, following the rise witnessed in the final stretch of 2016, has contributed 
to keeping global funding conditions relatively stable. Yet as the fiscal impulse is rolled 
out, there is likely to be a more or less gradual tightening, which might have adverse 
effects particularly on those economies more exposed to dollar financing, but also at 
the global level, if there is a pass-through to the long-term interest rates of the other 
countries. 
The geographical proximity and the close trade, labour market and financial links between 
Mexico and the United States mean that the Mexican economy is one of those potentially 
most affected by the increase in uncertainty associated with the possible changes in US 
economic policy. Indeed, in the weeks following the US presidential election, the Mexican 
financial markets underwent a heavy downturn. However, this downturn has partially been 
reversed thanks to the firmness of the global economy, the stabilisation of the dollar and 
the prospect of a limited scope to the renegotiation of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA).
Beyond Mexico, the emerging economies in general are particularly sensitive to a potential 
tightening of global financial conditions, to bouts of deteriorating investor sentiment and 
to measures that restrict trade, financial exchanges and migratory flows (in relation to 
potential revisions in the growth outlook see Chart 1.1.D). In particular, the economies 
that are highly dependent on external financing and carry foreign currency-denominated 
debt, without sufficient financial hedges or real coverage, might be affected by interest 
rate rises abroad and the depreciation of their currencies. Among these economies are 
some to which the Spanish corporate sector is significantly exposed, and in which, given 
the distribution of deposit institutions’ financial activity abroad (see Chart 1.2), exposure 
is notable. 
The Turkish economy is one of those most exposed to a tightening of international 
financial conditions, given its dependence on external financing. Following the failed 
coup d’état last July, economic activity shrank severely in the second half of 2016, and 
the year ended with a GDP growth of 2.9% (down from 6.1% in 2015). Economic policy 
headroom is very constrained and, in fact, the central bank is tightening its monetary 
policy to avoid the depreciation of its currency, to contain inflation and to sustain capital 
inflows. The soundness of public finances provides a necessary source of support to 
ground its economic recovery. 
... in particular in the United 
States, where rates are 
expected to continue rising, 
and which…
… may affect certain 
economies, mainly emerging 
ones, such as Mexico
Turkey is tightening its 
monetary policy in order 
to prevent the depreciation 
of the lira and contain inflation 
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Brazil is an economy much less dependent on external financing conditions and its degree of 
trade openness is limited. However, from a domestic standpoint, the process of adjustment 
in light of the serious fiscal and institutional crisis beleaguering the country is proving slower 
than anticipated, and there was a decline in GDP of 3.6% at end-2016 (following the 3.8% 
decline in 2015). Domestic demand has continued to contract at high rates against the 
backdrop of a heavy decline in lending and a worsening labour market. On the positive side, 
the adjustment of expenditure and revenue linked to the tax amnesty have contributed to the 
attainment of the primary deficit objective and have generated some confidence in the 
Government’s gradual consolidation strategy. Further, the strong reduction in inflation, which 
stood at around 5% in February, broadens the central bank’s margin for manoeuvre to 
continue reducing the policy interest rate, following the cuts totalling 250 bp implemented 
since July 2016. In any event, restoring fiscal credibility remains key to anchoring the recovery 
and, in this respect, following the approval of the constitutional amendment limiting public 
spending growth to that of inflation, the government has proposed a key reform to a pension 
system that was causing unsustainable pension expenditure slippage. 
Taking a more systemic view, in China’s case the risks to growth appear to have eased in the 
short term as a result of the stimulus policies to support activity and of the administrative 
measures to check capital outflows and stabilise the currency market. Although certain 
imbalances in the economy have increased, especially the excessive increase in credit and 
high corporate debt, the authorities have the tools to manage the situation with some leeway.
Finally, the UK economy is another source of risk. The activation of Clause 50 of the 
European Union Treaty marks the formal start of negotiations for the United Kingdom to 
leave the EU and establish a new framework of relations between both economic parties. 
The precise configuration of this new framework, in particular regarding the provision of 
financial services, is a very significant matter for the prospects of the EU and, above all, of 
the United Kingdom. More generally, although the UK economy has shown notable 
resilience after the referendum, the latest data point to some slowing in economic activity 
in this new setting. It cannot be ruled out that, during the negotiations, some episodes of 
stress on financial markets may arise, mainly in Europe. 
Developments on financial markets in this period have come to be chiefly influenced by 
the aforementioned change in economic policy stance. Following the electoral result in the 
United States, expectations over the expansionary effects of the economic policies 
announced by the new administration have tended to be predominant, giving rise to an 
increase in share prices, a reduction in credit risk premia and a moderate increase in the 
Brazil, undergoing adjustment, 
saw its GDP shrink by 3.6% in 
2016, against the background 
of a decline in lending and a 
reduction in interest rates
The risks emanating from 
China appear to have eased 
In the United Kingdom, 
following the activation 
of the procedure to exit the 
EU, the latest data point to 
some slowing in the economy
Against this background, the 
financial markets have tended 
to react positively to the 
expected re-gearing 
of economic policies…
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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term premium and in interest rates (see Charts 1.3.A and B). Indeed, after something of a 
rise immediately after the election, the implied volatility indices, which reflect the cost of 
guarding against an increase in uncertainty, are at very low levels, in contrast to the 
increase in the indicators proxying the degree of political uncertainty (see Chart 1.3.C). 
As to the emerging markets, following a very negative initial reaction to the outcome of the 
US presidential election, some optimism has also been observed. This has translated into 
strong capital inflows in the opening months of the year, increases in stock market indices 
and declines in risk premia in most areas (see Charts 1.3.D and E). 
SOURCES: Datastream, Bloomberg, New York Federal Reserve, Economic Policy Uncertainty, Consensus Forecast and Banco de España.
a Average volatility of bond markets (MOVE), stock markets (VIX) and exchange rates for the dollar against the euro, yen and sterling.
b Index of Global Economic Policy Uncertainty (Global EPU Index).
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In any event, despite the relative complacency on capital markets, several factors might 
alter this context and affect the prices of various financial assets. 
Thus, an environment of higher economic growth and inflation pressures in the United 
States (see Chart 1.3.F) might entail a swifter upward adjustment in interest rates than 
expected by investors; that would not only affect the long-term yields on US debt – which 
continue to hold at relatively low levels – but might also spread to the credit, equity and 
foreign exchange markets, as well as to other countries, given the United States’ central 
position in the international financial system. 
Moreover, the high stock market prices in the United States are partly underpinned not 
only by the improvement in the business earnings posted to date, but also by the expected 
effect of the ambitious agenda for tax and regulatory changes. In this respect, a slower or 
less ambitious than expected implementation of certain measures, or indeed their non-
approval, might also trigger significant adjustments in these markets.
Finally, the influence of bouts of geopolitical uncertainty cannot be ruled out in an 
environment in which protectionist trends are increasing in the trade sphere and in which 
the tensions surrounding migratory flows persist. 
Since the previous FSR, published in November 2016, the trend of prices of financial 
assets issued by euro area residents has been in line with that on the main international 
markets. Stock market indices have risen, long-term debt yields have increased and credit 
risk premia have declined (see Chart 1.4). These developments have been accompanied, 
… although the setting 
is not free from risks
1.2  Financial markets in 
the euro area and 
in Spain
SOURCES: Banco de España, Bloomberg and Datastream.
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moreover, by a decline in implied volatilities on equity markets (see Chart 1.5.A), and they 
appear to respond to a more favourable market view of the international macroeconomic 
outlook and less concern by the markets about risks. This view is despite greater 
uncertainty about future economic developments, linked in part to the course of economic 
policies in some of the main advanced economies, such as the United States, the United 
Kingdom and the euro area itself. Therefore, in the euro area political risk indices surged to 
historical highs during the first quarter (see Chart 1.5.B) as a result of the uncertainty 
regarding the results of the elections held in specific euro area countries. Subsequently, in 
the aftermath of the first round of the French elections, there was a slight recovery in 
European financial asset prices, particularly in those which had been hit harder by doubts 
about the final outcome of those elections.
Euro area bank share prices have also generally moved on a path of recovery, with rises in 
the indices for the sector (by around 29% since late October) that have been sharper than 
those in broad indices (around 18% in the case of the Euro Stoxx 50). Notwithstanding, 
share prices are still at low levels relative to book values. CDS premia have held on a 
declining trend and long-term bond issuance costs have risen, in line with the pattern 
observed on the government debt markets. 
In the euro area financial 
markets, stock market indices 
have risen, long-term debt 
yields have increased and 
credit risk premia have 
declined, and this despite the 
heightened uncertainty over 
the economic outlook
The prices of securities issued 
by euro area banks have 
shared these same trends, 
albeit with greater intensity
SOURCES: Banco de España, Bloomberg and Datastream.
a Economic Policy Uncertainty Index. S. Davis, "An Index of Global Economic Policy Uncertainty”, www.PolicyUncertainty.com.
b Difference between the 10-year and the 3-month rate. The dotted lines represent the historical averages of the series from 01.01.2001.
c The cyclically adjusted PER is calculated as the ratio of share price to 10-year moving average earnings. The dotted lines represent the historical averages of the 
series from 02 01 2005.
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On the Spanish market, the 10-year bond yield has increased from 1.2% at end-October 
last year to 1.6% at the cut-off date for this FSR. Given that the equivalent German rate 
has increased to a lesser extent over this period, the spread between both has widened 
from 100 bp to close to 130 bp. In the private sector, the rise in securities issuance costs 
is estimated to have eased owing to the reduction in credit risk premia, both in the case of 
banks and non-financial corporations. On stock markets, the rise in Spanish securities 
indices has been similar to that observed in the euro area as a whole, both in the case of 
the overall and specific banking sector indices. 
The rise in long-term debt yields has steepened the slope of the yield curve, bringing it 
closer to its historical averages (see Chart 1.5.C), which may be interpreted as a normalisation 
movement. On euro area equity markets, the valuation indicators show that prices are not 
misaligned with their historical relationship to corporate earnings (see Chart 1.5.D). In any 
event, the recent pick-up in European and international markets appears to be underpinned 
by brighter market expectations about macroeconomic developments and by less concern 
about risks. In this respect, the materialisation of any of the risks to world growth discussed 
in the previous section might translate into financial asset price corrections and/or into 
additional increases in long-term interest rates which, were they abrupt, might trigger 
potential negative effects both on the financing conditions for the various agents and on the 
value of deposit institutions’ portfolios. 
In the second half of 2016, economic activity in the euro area continued to expand at a 
quarter-on-quarter rate of 0.5%, in line with the average growth observed practically since 
early 2015, and over last year as a whole, GDP grew by 1.8%. The latest ECB projections, 
relating to March, point to the maintenance of similar rates of increase between 2017 and 
2019 (see Chart 1.6.A). This dynamism is expected to continue to be boosted mainly by 
the increase in domestic demand, against a background of very favourable financing 
conditions, further progress in deleveraging in all sectors and the sound performance of 
the labour market, adding to which would be some recovery in world demand over the 
forecasting horizon. 
Euro area inflation, measured by the HICP, climbed from 0.4% year-on-year in September 
2016 to 1.5% in March this year (the latest figure). But this increase is the outcome of the 
stripping out of the base effects of previous declines in oil prices and, to a lesser extent, 
of the unanticipated rise in the price of oil. The more stable components (which exclude 
On the Spanish markets, the 
Spanish government debt yield 
spread over the German 
benchmark has widened, and 
the rise in listed company share 
prices has been in line with that 
observed in the euro area 
While in the euro area there 
are no signs that financial 
asset prices are out of kilter 
with their fundamentals, the 
materialisation of certain risks 
might give rise to price 
corrections and a tightening of 
financing conditions 
1.3  The macroeconomic 
environment in 
the euro area 
and in Spain
Sustained but moderate GDP 
growth in the euro area, which 
is expected to continue over 
the forecasting horizon
A notable and higher-than-
expected rise in inflation, but 
driven by temporary factors 
SOURCES: INE, Eurostat and Banco de España.
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energy and unprocessed food) continued to show no clear signs of recovery. In step with 
this, the ECB projections in March this year included a significant upward revision in the 
growth of prices in 2017, estimated at around 1.7%, subsequently holding around this 
figure, although the outlook with respect to the inflation measure that excludes the most 
volatile components scarcely posted any changes. 
The main risks to the firming of this scenario of sustained recovery and headway towards 
meeting the euro area inflation objectives stem from the external environment. And adding 
to these is the uncertainty over future economic policies, arising from the elections that will 
take place in several countries in the area over the course of 2017, as was previously 
mentioned in section 1.2.
Against this backdrop the ECB Governing Council, at its December meeting, decided to 
extend the duration of its asset purchase programme by nine months, up to the end of the 
current year, and, at least, until inflation resumes a path consistent with the medium-term 
price stability objective, albeit at a slightly lower pace than that applied to March this year 
(€60 billion per month, as opposed to €80 billion previously). It also decided to hold 
interest rates unchanged, confirming that they will remain at low levels, as at present, for 
a prolonged period, going beyond the horizon of the financial securities purchases. It 
further stands ready to apply additional measures, if necessary. Subsequently, in March 
this year, the Governing Council reiterated its position and the future outlook in respect of 
monetary policy, although it highlighted the diminished likelihood of having to adopt 
further expansionary measures as a result of the significant reduction in deflation risks in 
the euro area.
In Spain, economic activity continued to post a high rate of increase, with GDP growth of 
0.7% quarter-on-quarter both in the third and fourth quarters of 2016. While these figures 
are somewhat down on the first half of the year, for the year as a whole the increase in 
GDP was 3.2%, identical to that recorded in 2015. Behind this expansion was the 
favourable course of domestic demand (with year-on-year growth of 2.9%) and a 
marginally positive contribution by the external sector. The information available suggests 
that, during 2017 Q1, GDP growth is estimated to have been somewhat higher than that 
three months earlier. The latest projections (corresponding to March 2017) released by 
the Banco de España for the 2017-2019 period revise upwards the previous projections 
of December 2016 (from 2.5% to 2.8% for 2017, from 2.1% to 2.3% for 2018 and from 
2.0% to 2.1% for 2019) and reveal a continuation of the expansionary path, albeit at more 
moderate rates as a result of the tailing off of the temporary expansionary impulses 
attributable to the declining course of oil prices, the improvement in residents’ financing 
conditions and the expansionary fiscal policy stance (see Chart 1.6.B).  
The year-on-year rate of change of the CPI rose in Spain from 0.2% in September 2016 to 
2.3% in March this year (the latest information available). This increase was clearly higher 
than that in the euro area and marks a change in the sign of the inflation differential between 
the two areas (measured by the HICP), which shifted from being 0.4 percentage points (pp) 
lower in Spain to being 0.6 pp lower in the euro area. However, this development was 
essentially due to the behaviour of the energy sector, and therefore it will foreseeably be 
transitory. The measure of core inflation, which excludes the more volatile components of 
energy and unprocessed food, showed a much smaller increase of 0.2 pp in the period in 
question. Further to the notable movements in oil prices, the Banco de España forecasts 
for the current year were revised upwards by 0.7 pp to 2.2% for 2017 as a whole, compared 
with what was expected six months earlier, but they held relatively unchanged for 2018 
The main risks stem from 
the external sector and 
from the political uncertainty 
in some euro area countries 
Against this backdrop, 
the Eurosystem extended the 
duration of its asset purchase 
programme and held interest 
rates unchanged 
Spanish GDP remains 
notably dynamic. And, 
on the forecasts available, 
this is expected to continue 
in the coming years, albeit 
at more moderate rates 
The rise in inflation in Spain 
outpaced that in the euro area 
owing to the increase 
in energy prices
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and 2019 (when respective increases of 1.5% and 1.7% are expected, similar figures to 
those projected for the euro area). 
In the housing market, the pick-up in demand during the second half of 2016 continued, 
albeit at a slightly declining pace. For the year as a whole, sales climbed over 10% relative 
to 2015 and the year-on-year rate of increase in prices ended the year at 4.5%, 0.3 pp up 
on 12 months earlier, marking the third consecutive year of increases. The firmness of the 
sector was conducive to greater dynamism in housing starts which, however, started from 
extraordinarily low levels, and where there is still a relatively high overhang of unsold 
properties, against a background of low growth in the number of households. 
The increases in economic activity, corporate profitability and employment are contributing 
to improving the aggregate wealth position of Spanish households and non-financial 
corporations, by raising their income in a setting in which their debt continues to decline. 
Low interest rates have, moreover, prompted declines in the debt burden which, in both 
sectors, is currently at its lowest level since 2000 (see Chart 1.7). In the case of households, 
the recovery in the housing market has helped increase their wealth and is a further factor 
strengthening their financial position. Lower private debt means that both households and 
firms are generally less vulnerable to adverse developments in their income or to a rise in 
interest rates, although the prevalence of short-term financing and/or at variable interest 
rates means that the transmission of movements in money market yields to average 
outstanding debt costs is relatively swift. 
The pick-up in prices and 
volumes in the housing market 
continues 
Improvement in the wealth 
position of households and 
non-financial corporations 
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Estimated interest payments plus repayments of principal.
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In the public sector, the formation of a new Government at the end of last year and the first 
adjustment measures implemented since then have enabled the budget deficit target 
agreed with the European Council for 2016 to be met. That said, public debt is still very 
high, standing at a level close to 100%, and is a source of vulnerability in the face of 
adverse economic developments or increases in the cost of financing, although in this 
latter case the lengthy average maturity of outstanding debt is a significant mitigating 
factor. Furthermore, the swollen volume of liabilities in this sector is reflected in the nation’s 
net international investment position (IIP) which, though it has fallen by more than 10 pp 
from its June 2014 peak, was still standing in December 2016 (the latest available date) at 
85.7% of GDP. That is a high figure in international comparative terms and is a factor of 
vulnerability to potential shocks in the funding markets. The foregoing developments 
therefore advise promptly resuming a fiscal consolidation drive, following two years – 2015 
and 2016 – in which budgetary policy has evidenced a slightly expansionary stance. 
Overall, the headway made in correcting the imbalances built up during the pre-crisis 
upturn has provided for a return to a significant pace of activity in recent years and has 
also prompted a moderation in the degree of vulnerability of the Spanish economy. 
Nonetheless, some factors of uncertainty persist, relating essentially to the external 
environment as discussed in the first section of this chapter. Particularly of note is the 
uncertainty surrounding the United Kingdom’s exit from the EU, with potentially adverse 
effects for the Spanish economy, and that relating to the outcome of certain European 
elections. 
The new Government’s first 
adjustment measures raise the 
likelihood of meeting the new 
general government deficit 
targets, although some 
uncertainty and a high level 
of debt persist, which is also 
reflected in our economy’s 
still-swollen external debt 
Overall, despite the headway 
in correcting imbalances 
and the recent dynamism 
of activity, some factors of 
uncertainty still persist 
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2 BANKING RISKS, PROFITABILITY AND SOLVENCY
This chapter analyses the situation of Spanish deposit institutions and the main risks they 
face in performing their activity. In summarising the behaviour of the key variables of the 
Spanish banking sector in 2016, it should be noted that consolidated total assets 
decreased by 1.7%, mainly as a result of the performance of business in Spain, where 
lending to the resident private sector fell by 4%. Non-performing exposures continued to 
decline, albeit at a slower rate. As a result, the NPL ratio of the private sector in Spain fell 
by 1 pp year-on-year, to 9.2% in December 2016. Consolidated income attributed to the 
parent company of the sector as a whole exceeded €10.8 billion in 2016, 21% less than in 
2015. Finally, in terms of the system’s solvency, the common equity tier 1 (CET1) ratio rose 
slightly and stood at 12.8% in December 2016.
International exposure
Consolidated total assets of Spanish deposit institutions, including both their business in 
Spain and that of their subsidiaries and branches abroad, decreased by 1.7% year-on-
year, amounting to €3,603 billion at end-2016 (see Annex 1). This decrease is the result of 
the performance of activity in Spain, with total financial assets (derivatives, equity 
instruments, debt securities and loans), which accounted for more than 90% of total 
assets in December 2016, falling by 4% during the year, compared with December 2015 
(see Chart 2.1). Abroad, total financial assets increased slightly by 1.1% year-on-year.
As regards the credit portfolio, the main geographical areas where business abroad is 
concentrated are: Europe (with more than half of the total exposure and, in particular, the 
United Kingdom, with 26.2%), Latin America (29.4%) and the United States, with 16.1% 
(see Charts 1.2.A and 2.2).1
1  Strategic decisions adopted by the main Spanish deposit institutions in 2017 Q1 in connection with their 
international expansion have not been taken into consideration.
2.1 Banking risks
2.1.1 CREDIT RISK
In December 2016 financial 
assets abroad grew by 1.1%, 
but decreased by 4% in 
business in Spain
The credit portfolio abroad 
is concentrated mainly in 
Europe (United Kingdom), 
followed by Latin America 
and the United States
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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Lending by Spanish deposit institutions abroad is mainly to households, particularly for 
house purchase (46.9%), and to non-financial corporations (29.5%). In Europe, credit 
exposure is substantially concentrated in lending to households (particularly for house 
purchase), while in Latin America and the United States the percentages of loans to 
households and to non-financial corporations are similar. 
Chart 2.3 shows the percentage changes in loan portfolios of the major countries where 
Spanish institutions engage in business abroad and the performance of exchange rates 
of currencies other than the euro. As the Chart shows, the growth of business abroad in 
2016 was largely affected by the performance of exchange rates, although with some 
exceptions. Specifically, the loan portfolio in the United Kingdom declined by 10.4% 
year-on-year, in part owing to the appreciation of the euro against the pound sterling 
(16.7%). Conversely, in the United States the 6.6% increase in the credit portfolio was 
accompanied by a 3.2% depreciation of the euro against the dollar. Similarly, in Brazil and 
Chile, the appreciation of the Brazilian real (20.4%) and the Chilean peso (8.3%) gave rise 
to an increase in the credit portfolio of 30.7% and 18.4%, respectively, year-on-year. 
However, the loan portfolio in Mexico and Turkey decreased by 1.8% and 3.5%, 
respectively, in part owing to the depreciation of their respective currencies, the Mexican 
peso (15.1%) and the Turkish lira (16.7%).
By sector, lending to 
households for house 
purchase was noteworthy, 
as was financing of business 
activities
The increase in business 
abroad was conditioned by 
the performance of exchange 
rates, with some exceptions
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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As discussed above, in general terms, the international business of Spanish institutions 
grew slightly during 2016, in line with the improvement of activity worldwide. However, 
uncertainty regarding growth projections (particularly in the countries mentioned in Chapter 1) 
is a risk which, should it materialise, might restrict bank operations abroad.
In any event, it should be noted that the activity of Spanish deposit institutions abroad is 
conducted through subsidiaries under financial independence criteria and it is generally a 
local activity in local currency, which substantially mitigates the risks arising therefrom, 
including, inter alia, interconnectedness and financial contagion risks.
Non-performing loans
Total non-performing loans at consolidated level decreased during 2016 by 10.3% year-
on-year. Thus, in 2016 the volume of non-performing loans continued the downward trend 
which commenced in 2014, with rates of decline in excess of 10%. The relative weight of 
non-performing loans in total assets also declined, from 4.5% in December 2015 to 4.1% 
a year later (see Annex 1). 
This decline in the volume of non-performing loans led to a total NPL ratio of 4.8% in 
December 2016 (compared with 5.3% in December 2015) and to a decrease in the NPL 
ratio (loans excluding fixed income) of 0.6 pp, to 5.6% at December 2016 (6.2% a year 
earlier), despite the decline in the volume of loans at consolidated level. In addition, the 
NPL ratio of the private sector also fell by 67 bp, from 7.1% in December 2015 to 6.5% a 
year later. 
Spanish deposit institutions recorded NPL ratios that were generally lower in their business 
abroad than in their business in Spain. Specifically, in December 2016 the NPL ratios in 
countries where Spanish institutions have higher exposure were lower than 5% (even 
below 2% in the United Kingdom and the United States, where almost half of the 
international exposure of Spanish banks is concentrated), except in Portugal and Poland 
(with NPL ratios of 8.1% and 6.1%, respectively). In 2016 NPL ratios in the main countries 
continued to decline, except in the United States and Turkey (with an increase of less than 
0.2 pp) and Portugal (which grew nearly 1.5 pp) (see Chart 2.4.A).
At European level, the data included by the European Banking Authority (EBA) in its 
quarterly risk dashboard2 reveal that the EU aggregate NPL ratio declined during 2016, 
reaching 5.1% in December 2016 (as compared with 5.7% in December 2015). Nonetheless, 
a high dispersion among countries persisted, with NPL ratios ranging from 1% in Sweden 
to almost 50% in Greece and Cyprus (see Chart 2.4.B). Spain’s position is slightly above 
the EU average. These NPL levels reflect the size and diversification of Spain’s largest 
banking groups’ business abroad.
Chart 2.4.C analyses the changes in the NPL ratio in 2016 and determines the contribution 
of each of its components (non-performing loans vis-à-vis total loans) to the performance 
of the ratio. Thus, in the case of Spain, the NPL ratio decreased by 59 bp during 2016 to 
5.7% (6.3% in December 2015). This contraction is explained by the decline in the volume 
of non-performing loans, which offsets the incremental effect on the NPL ratio of the fall in 
the volume of total loans. As in the case of Spain, most European countries experienced 
2  The EBA risk dashboard is based on a sample of risk indicators from 198 European banks and can be found at: 
http://www.eba.europa.eu/risk-analysis-and-data/risk-dashboard.
The volume of non-performing 
loans has continued to decline 
by more than 10%...
... leaving the total NPL ratio 
below 5%
In general, the NPL 
ratio in the main countries 
where Spanish banks operate 
does not reach 5%
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an improvement in the NPL ratio during 2016, largely owing to a decline in non-performing 
loans. Thus, for the group of institutions considered by the EBA, the NPL ratio decreased 
by 59 bp, and it can be said that this contraction arose largely from the decrease in the 
volume of non-performing loans.
SOURCES: Banco de España and European Banking Authority.
a NPL ratio in Greece and Cyprus is 45.9% and 44.8%, respectively.
b To avoid excessive volatility, the breakdown of change in NPL ratio is shown only for those countries with a loan volume of more than €500 bn. The green diamond 
shows, for each country, the total change in NPL ratio from December 2015 to December 2016. The blue and dark red bars show the portion of this change 
attributable to changes in non-performing loans and in total loans, respectively. Negative bars denote an inter-period reduction in non-performing loans and an 
inter-period increase in total loans, which are changes that would result in a reduction in NPL ratio.
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Based on the results published by the EBA in the 2016 transparency exercise, with data as 
at June 2016,3 a comparison can be made within Europe of the levels of non-performing 
loan coverage and security (both collateral and financial guarantees) received by the 
institutions for such loans. As Chart 2.5.A shows, provisions recorded to cover possible 
losses associated with non-performing loans (coverage of NPLs) at Spanish institutions 
(44.8%) stood in June 2016 at slightly above the European average (44.1%), with a level of 
coverage higher than at German and British banks (38.6% and 28.8%, respectively) and 
slightly lower than at French and Italian banks (50.7% and 46.4%, respectively). In terms 
of security received from institutions in connection with non-performing loans (see Chart 
2.5.B), as at June 2016 non-performing loans at Spanish institutions were secured by 
guarantees or collateral for a gross amount of 50.4% of the related loan amount. This 
percentage of collateralisation stood 8 pp above the European average, up to 20 pp higher 
than the percentage for German banks, 19 pp higher than that for French banks and 11 pp 
above that for Italian banks.
Domestic exposure
In business in Spain, lending to the resident private sector in 2016, analysed using the 
individual financial statements of deposit institutions, fell by 4% year-on-year. This 
contraction of the volume of lending is slightly higher than that seen a year earlier, with a 
year-on-year change of –3.8% at December 2015 (see Chart 2.6.A). As in prior FSRs, the 
sharper fall in lending in 2016 was largely due to the decline in lending to financial 
corporations (investment funds, securitisation funds, insurance companies, pension funds 
and other financial institutions other than monetary financial institutions), which fell 19.7% 
year-on-year at end-2016, compared with the 0.5% increase observed a year earlier. If 
lending to financial corporations is excluded, lending at December 2016 would only have 
decreased by 2.7%.
As Chart 2.6.A shows, the moderation of the rates of decline in lending to households and 
non-financial corporations is shared by the different sectors and types of lending. This is 
particularly significant in lending to households, with a year-on-year change of -2.1% at 
3  The results of the 2016 transparency exercise conducted by the EBA can be found at: http://www.eba.europa.
eu/risk-analysis-and-data/eu-wide-transparency-exercise/2016.
The NPL coverage ratio of 
Spanish institutions was 
similar to the European 
average, and the level of 
security (collateral and 
financial guarantees provided), 
was above the European 
average
Lending to the resident private 
sector in the case of business 
in Spain continued to fall in 
2016, albeit at a lower rate 
than in 2015 excluding 
financial corporations
The moderation of the rates of 
decline is shared by the 
different sectors and types of 
lending
SOURCE: European Banking Authority.
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end-2016, compared with a fall of 4.3% at December 2015. In the case of lending to non-
financial corporations the decline over the course of 2016 was 3.5% year-on-year, against 
a contraction of 4.1% a year earlier.
The analysis of lending to non-financial corporations by branch of activity reveals that in 
lending to activities other than construction and real estate the trend for the related rates of 
decline to be contained continued. In particular, although lending to these other activities 
commenced 2016 with higher year-on-year falls than those of the preceding months, it 
recorded a year-on-year change of -0.2% at end-2016, compared with -0.8% a year earlier. 
Lending to construction and real estate activities continued to decrease during 2016, with 
a fall of 10.5% year-on-year as at December 2016, similar to that of 2015 (-10.4%).
Chart 2.6.B includes each sector of activity’s share in funding received by non-financial 
corporations, and the related changes over time. In December 2016, real estate activities 
continued to be the main type of lending, accounting for 22.7% of total loans received by 
The rates of decline in lending 
to construction and real estate 
activities were unchanged and 
the decline in lending to other 
non-financial activities was 
contained...
... reducing the share of 
lending to construction and 
real estate activities in...
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Includes securitisations.
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activity has declined by around €220 billion, entailing a reduction 
of almost 60% from €376 billion at end-2011 to €157 billion as at 
December 2016 (see Chart A). A portion of this decline (around 
€75 billion) was due to the transfers of credits to Sareb (by the so-
called Group 1 banks in December 2012, and the Group 2 banks 
in February 2013), but, even without taking into account these 
transfers, the deleveraging trend in the sector is notable.
In relative terms, the fall – specifically, 9.5 pp – is also significant. 
Hence, credit for construction and real estate development 
accounted for 22.5% of total credit to the resident private sector 
(households and firms) at end-2011, and this percentage stood at 
13% at end-2016. 
One of the factors behind the last Spanish banking crisis was the 
excessive growth of credit to the construction and real estate 
development sector. The deleveraging and progressive clean-up 
of the sector, along with the economic pick-up, account for the 
improvement in banks’ financial position. However, despite this, 
the stock of credit in the real estate sector is still high and will 
foreseeably require some time yet before finally normalising. This 
box analyses in detail the situation of and changes in credit to the 
construction and real estate development sector in Spain. 
In the past five years, the decline in credit earmarked for 
construction and real estate activities has been significant. In 
absolute terms, the outstanding balance of credit for this type of 
BOX 2.1CREDIT FOR CONSTRUCTION AND REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT IN RECENT YEARS IN SPAIN 
non-financial corporations, although this percentage has declined most notably in recent 
years, from 35.3% in December 2010. Along the same lines, lending to construction 
decreased significantly, standing at 7.3% in December 2016 (far removed from 17.2% ten 
years earlier), underlining the adjustment that took place in these sectors and the reduction 
of risk in the balance sheet of Spanish banks. Box 2.1 includes a more detailed analysis of 
changes in lending to construction and real estate activities.
... lending to non-financial 
corporations as a whole
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CREDIT FOR CONSTRUCTION AND REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT IN RECENT YEARS IN SPAIN (cont´d) BOX 2.1
The situation in respect of non-performing loans to construction and 
real estate development activities is a good measure of the crisis and 
of the progressive recovery of the economy in Spain. The NPL ratio 
in this sector grew notably to 2013 (to levels of over 37%), and it held 
there until late 2014, whereafter it began to fall, to 26.5% in December 
2016 (see Chart B). In absolute terms the peak was reached in June 
2012, given that the transfers to Sareb largely reduced NPLs. In 
December 2016, the sector’s NPLs stood at €41.6 billion. 
The growth of non-performing loans was accompanied by an 
increase in their coverage. From 2011 to 2013, the NPL coverage 
ratio increased by 19 pp from 36% in 2011 to 55% in December 
2013. And, since then, it has held stable at slightly higher than 50%, 
until last year, when it rose up to close to 60% (see Chart C). 
Against the general background of debt reduction in recent 
years, credit to non-financial corporations other than those 
pursuing construction and real estate activities has also declined. 
However, this reduction has been comparatively much less 
marked than that in the construction and real estate development 
sector. Chart D thus shows that the proportion of credit to 
construction and real estate activities has diminished appreciably 
in favour of that to other business activities. The percentage of 
credit to construction and real estate development has fallen 
from accounting for almost half of the credit to non-financial 
corporations (46%) in 2011 to representing less than one-third 
(30%) five years later.
In short, the ongoing deleveraging in the construction and real 
estate development sector has been significant in recent years 
in Spain. Nonetheless, the volume of troubled assets remains 
high, and their progressive reduction will contribute to enhancing 
the financial position and profitability of Spanish deposit 
institutions. 
Notable in the case of lending to households is the favourable performance of lending for 
purposes other than house purchase, with positive year-on-year rates of change since the 
beginning of 2016, which were consolidated over the course of the year, reaching 2.8% at 
end-2016, in clear contrast with the contraction of 1.1% observed in December 2015. 
Lending to households for house purchase also improved with respect to the preceding 
quarters, since the negative year-on-year rates of change (-2.9% at December 2016) were 
lower than those observed in 2015 (-4.8%). The improvement of lending to households for 
purposes other than house purchase explains the increasing importance of this segment 
in lending to households (see Chart 2.6.C), which accounted for 15.3% at December 2016, 
up from the minimum reached in 2013 (13.7%). Higher employment and income, together 
Lending to households other 
than for house purchase 
increased by 2.8% and 
lending for house purchase 
moderated its rate of 
contraction to –2.9%
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The volume of new transactions in 2014 relates to the twelve-month period from April 2014 to March 2015, since the 2014 data are not available from January. 
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with a greater appeal in terms of profitability for banks, explain this change. In any event, 
despite the change in trend, lending to households for purposes other than house purchase 
continues to be far removed from its share of more than 20% of lending to households 
before the onset of the crisis.
Chart 2.7.A shows changes in new mortgage loans for house purchase over a longer time 
frame. The chart shows the annual flow of new loans, the volume of the stock of loans at 
each year-end and the flow as a percentage of the stock. It can be seen that in recent 
years new lending is recovering, albeit slowly, and is still at levels far removed from those 
of the preceding decade. New loans for house purchase extended in 2016 accounted for 
4.6% of the stock of mortgage loans for house purchase at December 2016, almost 1 pp 
higher than the figure of 3.8% recorded in 2015.
Following the downward trend initiated in 2014, interest rates on new loans to households, 
both for house purchase and for consumption, stabilised in 2016. Interest rates on new 
loans to non-financial corporations continued to decrease over the course of 2016, 
although at a slower rate than that seen in prior months (see Chart 2.7.B).
As regards the explicit manifestation of credit risk, non-performing loans to the resident 
private sector continued to decrease throughout 2016, in line with the positive performance 
of the economy, which grew above 3%. However, the fall slowed over the course of the year 
after reaching its sharpest year-on-year decline in March (22.5%). In December 2016 the 
year-on-year rate of change in these assets was -13.6%. The fall from the all-time high in 
non-performing loans reached at end-2013 is substantial: more than €77 billion in absolute 
terms and more than 40% in relative terms (see Chart 2.8.A). The growth of the economy in 
general, as well as the recovery of employment and low interest rates are largely behind the 
aforementioned improvement in the levels of NPLs at banks. Insofar as the economy 
continues on this path it is likely that non-performing loans will continue to decrease.
By institutional sector and industry, the deceleration in the rate of decline was sharper in 
the case of households and, especially, in consumer loans, which rose slightly in December 
New mortgage loans for house 
purchase is recovering 
gradually, accounting for an 
increasing percentage of this 
credit segment 
Interest rates on new loans to 
households stabilised in 2016, 
while interest rates on loans to 
firms continued to decrease, 
albeit more moderately 
Non-performing loans 
continued to fall in 2016...
... although their rate of 
decline eased
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The transfers to Sareb by Group 1 and Group 2 banks in December 2012 and February 2013 affect the rates of change in those periods.
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20164 (see Chart 2.8.B). Conversely, the drop in non-performing loans at non-financial 
corporations, albeit smaller than in previous periods, continued to be substantial (-16.2% 
for construction and real estate activities and -18.6% for other non-financial firms).
Chart 2.9.A shows the situation in December 2016 of non-performing loans classified by 
institutional sector. Most non-performing loans are concentrated in corporate credit (69%) 
and within that category, the largest proportion relates to loans for construction and real 
estate activities (37% of the total), while the non-performing loans in lending to the other 
non-financial sectors accounts for 32% of the total. Most non-performing loans to 
households (accounting for 29% of the total) relate to house purchase (21% of the total), 
while the proportion of non-performing loans to households for all other purposes is 
smaller (8% of the total). Finally, the proportion of non-performing loans to financial 
corporations is very small (2% of the total).
4  As a result of the accounting changes arising from the amendment to Annex IX of Banco de España Circular 
4/2004 since the entry into force of Banco de España Circular 4/2016 of 27 April 2016, the volume of non-
performing loans in certain sectors may increase with respect to prior periods (an impact which cannot yet be 
calculated because the data are not available) owing to the inclusion in that category of part of the loans formerly 
considered substandard. Since the latter have disappeared as such from the new circular, depending on the 
borrower’s situation, they would now be reclassified as non-performing or under special surveillance.
Most non-performing loans 
relate to corporate credit...
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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As regards the segmentation of non-performing loans to non-financial corporations by firm 
size, based on data as at December 2016, 56% relate to loans to SMEs, while the remaining 
44% are non-performing loans to all other non-financial corporations (see Chart 2.9.B).
Among SMEs, the fall in non-performing loans is sharper in construction and real estate 
activities, decreasing by close to 30% at December 2016, than in the other sectors, where 
the decrease was slightly above 20% (see Chart 2.9.C). Despite this greater decline, based 
on data as at December 2016, the proportion of non-performing loans to SMEs in the 
construction and real estate activities sector is larger, 57% (see Chart 2.9.D), than that of 
non-performing loans to SMEs in all other sectors (43%).
As regards new non-performing loans, the decline observed in previous quarters continued 
in 2016 (see Chart 2.10.A). However, in the last quarter there was a rebound in new non-
performing loans, mainly in loans to households (see footnote 4 hereto). In the case of 
non-financial corporations, new non-performing loans of large firms continued to fall, while 
those of SMEs, which had dropped more sharply in previous quarters, rose in the last 
quarter (see Chart 2.10.B).
... and within that category, 
to SMEs…
... although they are declining, 
particularly in construction 
and real estate activities
New NPLs in 2016 continued 
the downward trend of 
previous quarters...
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a In each month, the cumulative amount of the last 12 months is depicted (12-month moving average).
b Shown beside each bar is the percentage each item represents of the total NPLs at the beginning of the period. NPLs recovered include both non-performing 
loans that become performing again and foreclosed assets.
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Charts 2.10.C and D compare the performance of non-performing loans (new NPLs, NPL 
write-offs and NPLs recovered) over the course of 2016 and 2015. Firstly, it can be seen 
that, as a result of the aforementioned deceleration in the decline of non-performing loans, 
the decrease in absolute terms in the volume of non-performing loans in 2016 was lower 
than in 2015. The weight of new non-performing loans in existing non-performing loans 
was slightly higher in 2016 than in 2015 (26.8%, compared with 24.1%). The percentage 
of transfers to write-offs was very similar (-15.5%, compared with -15.8%) and the weight 
of NPLs recovered declined (-24.9% compared with -30.5%).
... although the decrease 
in NPLs was lower in 2016 
than in 2015
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The transfers to Sareb by Group 1 and Group 2 banks in December 2012 and February 2013 affect the rates of change in those periods.
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In any event, the NPL ratio of the resident private sector in Spain continued to decline in 
2016, dropping by 1 pp to 9.2% at December 2016 (see Chart 2.11.A). This decrease in the 
NPL ratio arose from the decline in the volume of non-performing loans, which was sharper 
than that in the volume of lending to the resident private sector. However, as a result of the 
aforementioned deceleration of the fall in non-performing loans, there was a slowdown in 
the path of decline in the NPL ratio from the maximum year-on-year falls recorded at the 
beginning of the year (see Chart 2.11.B).
The NPL ratio fell in 2016 across all sectors. However, as discussed for non-performing 
loans, the decline in the ratio was lower for households and, specifically, for purposes other 
than house purchase, standing at 9.8% in December 2016, after having rebounded in 
recent quarters despite the growth of lending in this sector. The NPL ratio for lending to 
households for house purchase declined by 10 bp in 2016, reaching 4.6% at end-2016 (see 
Chart 2.11.C). The decreases in the ratios in the non-financial corporations segment were 
more significant. Thus, the NPL ratio for construction and real estate activities decreased 
by 1.8 pp, to 26.5%, between December 2015 and December 2016. The ratio for other non-
financial firms declined by almost 2.3 pp to 9.8% in December 2016.
By firm size, the largest decrease in the NPL ratio in 2016 (by more than 3 pp) related to 
SMEs, while at large corporations the ratio decreased by 1.4 pp and for sole proprietors it 
increased slightly. Despite this improved performance in 2016, the NPL ratio of SMEs at 
end-2016 stood at 18.1%, higher than the ratio for large corporations (12.3%) and that for 
sole proprietors (10.8%) (see Chart 2.11.D).
In December 2016 lending to the private sector at consolidated level by Spanish deposit 
institutions subject to forbearance measures amounted to €147 billion. Based on individual 
financial statement data, forborne credit amounted to almost €116 billion in December 
2016, representing a year-on-year decline of 32.5%.
During 2016 foreclosed assets or assets received in payment of debts arising from 
business in Spain and recorded in the balance sheets of Spanish deposit institutions, 
continued to decline, albeit slowly.5 Changes in their gross book value in recent years are 
5  Per public financial statement data on foreclosed assets or assets received in payment of debts (business in 
Spain) reported by deposit institutions.
The NPL ratio fell by 1 pp in 
2016 to 9.2% in December...
... and the falls in the ratios 
of non-financial corporations 
were sharper, both in 
construction and development 
and in other activities
Foreclosed assets recorded 
in the balance sheets of 
institutions continued to...
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Shown beside each bar is the percentage each item represents of the total foreclosed assets at the beginning of the year.
b Group 1 institutions were Banco Financiero y de Ahorros, NCG Banco, Catalunya Banc (currently integrated in BBVA) and Banco de Valencia (currently integrated 
in La Caixa).
c Group 2 institutions were BMN, Liberbank, Caja3 (currently integrated in Ibercaja) and CEISS (currently integrated in Unicaja).
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shown in Chart 2.12. It can be seen that, as in 2015, sales of foreclosed assets, amounting 
to more than €12 billion in 2016 (nearly 15% of the stock of foreclosures at end-2015) 
exceeded additions of new foreclosures (12.3% of the stock).
Owing to the decreases in non-performing loans and foreclosed assets during 2016, the 
volume of unproductive assets stood slightly above €190 billion in December 2016, a 
decline of more than 9% in the last year. Despite this reduction, these assets, which do not 
generate revenues, continue to account for a significant proportion of the balance sheet of 
institutions in their business in Spain and put downward pressure on the sector’s profitability.
In short, ex-post credit risk (non-performing loans, foreclosed and forborne assets) 
continued to improve over 2016, underpinned by the strong growth of economic activity, 
although the first signs of deceleration have been observed. An improvement in credit 
behaviour, based on ongoing positive developments in GDP and employment, would be 
significant in continuing to improve ex-post credit risk performance.
The systemic risk indicator (SRI), which has been published in the FSR since 2013,6 is a 
composite indicator of financial market tensions. Since the publication of the last FSR, 
6 See Box 1.1 of the May 2013 FSR for an explanation of its construction and interpretation.
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systemic risk in Spain has remained at the contained levels recorded since mid-July 2016. 
In the first few months of 2017, unlike at the beginning of 2016 (when downward stock-
market corrections raised the level of the systemic risk indicator), financial market tensions 
have remained low, falling below the levels observed before the US elections. Despite the 
odd isolated bout of stress in the sovereign debt market, tensions in securities, government 
debt, money and bank funding markets, measured jointly by means of the systemic risk 
indicator, have been limited (see Chart 2.13.A).
The contribution of Spanish banks to the systemic risk of the euro area as a whole is quantified 
by means of a model known as CoVaR.7 Following episodes of systemic alert recorded during 
the crisis, the average CoVaR of Spanish banks has remained relatively low (see Chart 2.13.B). 
In 2016, however, there were isolated increases relating to turbulence in the first few months 
of the year and after the British referendum in June. More recently there was an isolated fall in 
the CoVaR coinciding with the inauguration of the new US president. As regards European 
banks, volatility remained high, especially in the 5th percentile of the CoVaR. This shows the 
notable heterogeneity in the contributions of individual euro area banks to systemic risk.
Since the last FSR, euro area interbank market activity has remained very weak. Chart 
2.14.A shows EONIA trading volume, which remained low, with historic low levels recorded 
at the end of 2016. Developments were similar in the Spanish interbank market, with very 
small trading volumes both in the secured and unsecured segments, the role of the latter 
being of little significance, since in 2017 Q1 it only represented 5% of total trading.
This limited activity in the interbank market continues to be largely a consequence of 
excess liquidity, linked to the Eurosystem’s conventional and non-conventional monetary 
policy measures (see Chart 2.14.B), implemented through various asset purchase 
programmes and refinancing operations, including a series of four targeted longer-term 
refinancing operations (TLTRO II) carried out between June 2016 and March 2017. 
Chart 2.14.C shows the outstanding amount provided through ECB tenders, both for the 
Eurosystem as a whole and for institutions resident in Spain. It can be seen that European 
credit institutions, and Spanish ones in particular, have continued to make significant use 
of the liquidity provided by the Eurosystem, and have in fact notably increased the funding 
obtained through tenders with their TLTRO II bids. Thus, between the end of April 2016 
and the end of April 2017, gross funding increased by 51.7% in the euro area as a whole 
and by 33.3% in Spain. The share of funding allotted to banks resident in Spain in tenders 
stood in March 2017 at an average of 24.6%. Nonetheless, this share is becoming less 
representative as the Eurosystem purchase programme proceeds as the relative importance 
of refinancing operations is declining. In fact, the liquidity provided by this latter route, 
around €800 billion in total, amounted in April to around 40% of the amount provided by 
the Eurosystem through the purchase programme.
The issuance activity of Spanish deposit institutions was lower in 2016 than in 2015. This 
decline was similar to the one observed for other euro area institutions and occurred across 
all categories: senior debt, covered bonds and subordinated debt eligible as Tier 1 capital 
and Tier 2 capital (see Chart 2.14.D). During 2016, issuance activity was concentrated in Q1 
and fell thereafter. Among the various categories of issuance, that of covered bonds was 
notably high. In the first quarter of 2017 banks have been active in issuance, especially of 
subordinated debt eligible as Tier 2 capital.
7 For an explanation of the CoVaR model, see the May 2015 FSR.
Systemic risk has remained at 
low levels since the last FSR
2.1.3 FUNDING RISK
Euro area interbank market 
activity remained very weak…
… largely as a result of the 
Eurosystem’s liquidity 
provision policy
Spanish bank issuance in 
2016 was lower than in the 
previous year
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 40 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, MAY 2017
SOURCES: Bloomberg, Dealogic and Banco de España.
a Latest data: 25 April.
b Senior debt, covered bonds and subordinated debt tier 1 and tier 2 issues. Retained issues are not included.
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As regards retail funding, private sector deposits at consolidated level remained in 
December 2016 at similar levels to those of the same month a year earlier (with an increase 
of 0.8% year-on-year, see Annex 1). As for the volume of deposits abroad (see Chart 
2.15.A), the main geographical areas in which business abroad is concentrated are: Europe 
(which accounts for more than half of such deposits and, in particular, the United Kingdom 
with 27.1%), followed by Latin America (29%) and the United States with 15.3%. Overall, 
these three geographical areas account for more than 95% of private sector deposits (see 
Chart 2.15.B). In Europe and the United States private sector deposits mainly come from 
households (especially in the United Kingdom, where household deposits account for 
more than 70% of total deposits). By contrast, in Latin America the deposits of non-
financial corporations are similar to those of households (37% as against 33%).
Retail deposits taken by Spanish banks (from households and non-financial corporations) 
in business in Spain grew by 3.1% in December 2016 relative to the same month a year 
earlier (see Chart 2.16.A), which meant that the trend initiated at the beginning of 2015 
– when the fall in retail deposits began to moderate until positive rising rates of change 
were eventually achieved – continued. This growth in the deposits of households and non-
financial corporations occurred despite the ongoing decline in interest rates that has been 
observed for several years and which continued in 2016. This may be a consequence of the 
fact that alternative saving products do not offer savers a better yield-to-risk ratio.
In Europe and the United 
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from households, while in 
Latin America the proportion 
of deposits from non-financial 
corporations is similar to that 
of those from households
Retail deposits, in business in 
Spain, recovered slightly in 
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trend decline in interest rates
SOURCES: Banco de España and CNMV.
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Precisely because of these low yields, it was sight deposits that grew (by 17% year-on-
year), while time deposits continued to follow the downward trend of recent years (-18.8% 
from the previous year). This contrasting behaviour by sight and time deposits was even 
more evident last year (see Chart 2.16.B). 
As in recent years, the recovery of the deposits of households and non-financial 
corporations, along with the above-mentioned decline in lending, permitted a further 
reduction in the loan-to-deposit ratio in 2016. The marked downward trend dating back to 
2007 (see Chart 2.16.C) was thus extended.
In 2016, the net assets of investment funds increased by 7% (more than €15 billion) to 
€235 billion in December 2016. However, growth during the year was not smooth (see 
Chart 2.16.D). At the beginning of 2016, the net assets of investment funds declined owing 
to negative yields reflecting the instability on financial markets at that time. Thereafter, their 
net assets began to grow, especially as a result of the increase in net subscriptions during 
the year. The behaviour of yields was more irregular in 2016, with negative values in various 
months of the year, especially in June as a consequence of Brexit. In January 2017 this 
trend continued, with net positive subscriptions that slightly increased the net assets of 
investment funds, offsetting their negative yields.
In 2016, Spanish deposit institutions as a whole earned consolidated income attributed to the 
parent institution of more than €10.8 billion. This figure represents a reduction of 21.2% with 
respect to 2015 (see Annex 2), which translates into a decline of 8 bp in the return on assets 
(ROA), from 0.38% in 2015 to 0.3% in December 2016. The contributions of the various items 
of the income statement to this decline in ROA between December 2015 and December 2016 
are shown in Chart 2.17.A. Every item behaved unfavourably in comparison with the previous 
year, with the exception of operating expenses and financial asset impairment losses.
With respect to 2015, net interest income fell by 4.1% in December 2016. This was 
because, in the current low interest rate environment, the decline in financial costs was not 
sufficient to offset the fall in financial revenue (see Annex 2). Net commissions also 
declined, albeit to a lesser extent (by 0.6%). The notable fall in gains and losses on financial 
transactions, of around 30%, was mainly a consequence of the exchange differences, 
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arising from the depreciation by more than 15% of the pound sterling, the Mexican peso 
and the Turkish lira (see Chart 2.3). The positive contributions to the change in income 
came from operating expenses, which declined by more than 1%, and from financial asset 
impairment losses, which declined by 16%.
Even so, impairment losses did not decline as much as in previous periods, despite the 
continuing broad improvement in the credit quality of balance sheets, since one institution 
significantly increased its provisions in the final quarter of the year. Thus, as a percentage 
of average total assets impairment losses increased slightly in December with respect to 
June 2016, putting an end to the trend decline that dated back to December 2012 (see 
Chart 2.17.B).8 In addition, the item “Income from disposals” increased (greater losses) 
very significantly as a consequence of the higher provisioning requirements for foreclosed 
assets, partly due to the changes arising from the entry into force in 2016 Q4 of the new 
accounting circular of the Banco de España (CBE 4/2016).
In keeping with ROA, the return on equity (ROE) also fell last year, by 1.3 pp, from 5.6% in 
2015 to 4.3% in 2016. Chart 2.18 shows the changes in ROE over a lengthy time period, 
analysing the contribution of the numerator (consolidated income attributed to the parent 
institution) and of the denominator (equity) to the change in ROE. In the first few years of the 
21st century ROE was high, standing above 12% each year, and peaked in 2007 at almost 
20%. Thus, between 2000 and 2007, ROE increased by 6.5 pp, and the increase stemmed 
from the rise in income, since equity also grew, thereby reducing ROE. Thereafter ROE fell 
notably, mainly as a consequence of the reduction in income, although the increase in 
equity also reduced its value. In particular, between 2007 and 2013 ROE fell by almost 15 
pp to around 5%. In the next few years the ROE remained relatively steady at around this 
value. In 2015, as mentioned above, it stood at 5.6%, slightly higher than in 2013, owing to 
the increase (albeit limited) in income and despite the increase (also limited) in equity. The 
decline in ROE between 2015 and 2016 was mainly due to the above-mentioned reduction 
in profits, although the slight increase in equity also contributed to this decline. 
In comparative terms, Spain stands somewhat higher than the European average (on EBA 
data as at December 2016;9 see Chart 2.19), which reflects the pressure on profitability of 
8  If the provisions recorded by that institution in 2016 were excluded, impairment losses on financial assets as a 
percentage of ATA would have fallen to 0.47% and, consequently, the downward trend would have continued.
9  The data refer to a sample of 198 banks and are available at http://www.eba.europa.eu/riskanalysis-and-data/
risk-dashboard.
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a number of factors, including the current low interest rate environment, as analysed in 
detail in previous FSRs. Low interest rates put particular pressure on net interest income, 
making a search for alternative revenues one possibility in the attempt to strengthen the 
income statement. In this respect, Chart 2.20.A shows that net commissions as a 
percentage of gross income is lower in the Spanish banking sector than in the main 
European countries and below the European average.
The efficiency of the Spanish banking system, i.e. the management of resources to 
generate income remains favourable with respect to its European peers. That is to say, the 
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SOURCE: European Banking Authority.
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cost-to-income ratio of the sector is below the European average and below those of the 
main European countries (see Chart 2.20.B). Persisting with efforts to reduce operating 
expenses to increase operating efficiency is an effective alternative that should be pursued 
over a lengthy period to address the current narrowing of margins.
The profitability of business in Spain, according to the individual financial statements of 
institutions, performed relatively worse in 2016 than that of their consolidated activity at 
global level. As a result net income after tax fell by 34% from 2015, which translated into 
the reduction in ROE from 4.4% to 2.8%, although the dispersion across institutions was 
notable and some improved their income in Spain in comparison with 2015. The explanation 
for this behaviour is very similar to that of the consolidated activity at global level: general 
falls in margins, which the lower asset impairment losses (which fell less than in previous 
periods) did not manage to offset, leading to a decline in net income.
In particular, net interest income in business in Spain fell in 2016 (by 8%) somewhat more 
than at the global consolidated level. Chart 2.21.A shows the various components 
responsible for the change in 2015 and 2016. First, it can be seen that the price effect, 
determined by the low interest rates applied to interest earning assets and interest-bearing 
liabilities, is the factor that explained most of the decline in net interest income both in 
2015 and in 2016. The quantity effect, i.e. the contribution of activity, was also negative in 
both periods, reflecting the ongoing decline in banking activity (see Chart 2.6.A, which 
shows that the volume of total lending continued to fall in 2016). Finally, the composition 
of assets and liabilities contributed positively to the change in net interest income in both 
years, although its contribution of 2016 fell notably with respect to 2015, which explains 
the greater fall in net interest income in December 2016. 
Chart 2.21.B shows the changes in net interest income and in its two components, financial 
revenue and financial costs, over a longer time horizon. The trend is clear: financial revenue 
and costs and net interest income have been falling over the last five years. The fall in financial 
revenue is greater in absolute terms than that in financial costs (in relative terms the reverse is 
true), with the result that net interest income has been declining. The room for further decreases 
on the side of financial costs is becoming increasingly limited, as has been observed in previous 
FSRs, so that further falls in financial revenue may reduce net interest income more directly.
... banking systems of the 
main European countries 
The profitability of business in 
Spain was relatively worse 
than that of global 
consolidated activity 
Net interest income fell by 8% 
in 2016 in business in Spain, 
since the decrease in financial 
revenue was greater than that 
in financial costs, which have 
increasingly limited room for 
further decline 
PROFITABILITY
Business in Spain, ID
CHART 2.21
 12
 15
 18
 21
 24
 27
 30
 33
 36
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
FINANCIAL COSTS
FINANCIAL REVENUE
NET INTEREST INCOME (right-hand scale)
B  FINANCIAL REVENUE AND COSTS AND NET INTEREST INCOME
€bn€bn
SOURCE: Banco de España.
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
December 2015 December 2016
 QUANTITY
 PRICES
 COMPOSITION OF ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
 MIXED EFFECT
 RATE OF CHANGE OF NET INTEREST INCOME
A  PERCENTAGE OF THE CHANGE IN NET INTEREST INCOME EXPLAINED BY
EACH FACTOR
%
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 46 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, MAY 2017
The decline in the one-year EURIBOR from 2008 to date, when it 
stands at negative values, has activated clauses that limit how far 
interest rates can fall in mortgage loans granted to consumers 
(known as “floor clauses”).
As a result of a motion approved in September 2009, the plenary 
session of the Spanish Senate called for the Government to introduce 
a raft of measures, including «establishing the effective pass-through 
of declines in the EURIBOR to mortgage payments»; and, in this 
regard, on 26 January 2010 the Directorate General of the Treasury 
and Financial Policy requested the Banco de España to prepare a 
report. This report was published in the Official Gazette of the 
Spanish Parliament on 7 May 2010 and was based on information 
obtained from a sample of 49 credit institutions which were asked to 
provide quantitative and qualitative data on the characteristics of 
their mortgage portfolio insofar as floor and/or ceiling clauses (the 
latter being upper caps on interest rates) were concerned.
This information revealed that there were interest rate floors in 
29% of the portfolio analysed and within that percentage of the 
portfolio, 82% also had interest rate caps. The level of the interest 
rate floors and ceilings set by the institutions included in the 
sample, stood, in weighted average terms and considering the 
outstanding mortgage loans, at 3.12% and 13.56%, respectively.
The underlying principle in Spanish law governing the setting of 
interest rates in bank transactions is the freedom of contract and, 
thus, since floor clauses are yet another component of the price of a 
loan they are subject to the agreement of the contracting parties. 
While respecting the freedom of contract, Ministerial Order 
EHA/2899/2011 of 28 October 2011 on transparency and protection 
of banking services customers (the «Transparency Order») 
strengthened arrangements for information transparency and 
mortgagor protection in relation to interest rate variability, in addition 
to indicating the obligation of the notary public to specifically warn 
the borrower of any limits set on changes in interest rates – an 
obligation which already existed in the previous regulations. 
Noteworthy is the inclusion in the obligatory pre-contractual 
information provided to customers of several simulations of interest 
rate scenarios and specific separate additional information on the 
existence of limits on the variability of interest rates in the contract, 
showing the maximum and minimum mortgage payments. This 
measure had already been proposed in the Banco de España’s 2010 
report before it was incorporated into the Ministerial Order.
Additionally, Law 1/2013 of 14 May 2013 on measures to strengthen 
the protection of mortgagors, debt restructuring and rented social 
housing, provided that mortgage loan agreements entered into with 
individual borrowers in relation to dwellings with floor and ceiling 
clauses, must include in the public deed together with the customer’s 
signature, a statement in writing, in the terms determined by the 
Banco de España, whereby the borrower declares to have been 
adequately warned of the possible risks arising from the agreement.
There have been several legal rulings since 2013 which, to different 
degrees and with varying effects, have declared floor clauses null 
and void due to their unfair nature. Noteworthy, firstly is Judgment 
241/2013 of the Civil Division of the Supreme Court of 9 May 2013, 
whereby following the filing of a collective action, the floor clauses 
used by BBVA, CAJAMAR, S. Coop. de Crédito, and Caja de 
Ahorros de Galicia, Vigo, Orense y Pontevedra (at present 
«ABANCA»), were declared null and void (effective as from 9 May 
2013) because they did not respect consumer regulations or those 
on general contractual conditions.
Contrary to several previous court decisions, the judgment states 
that floor clauses are lawful in mortgage loans where there is 
sufficient transparency and clarity in the information provided on 
these clauses for consumers to be able to identify the main purpose 
of the agreement and the real distribution of risks relating to interest 
rate variability. In order to assess this point, the Supreme Court has 
provided for strengthened or dual transparency checks comprising, 
on one hand, the «incorporation check» and, on the other, the so-
called «actual understanding check». The first check is the inclusion 
of floor clauses in a clear, specific and straightforward manner in 
the general terms and conditions of agreements, while the second 
check requires that the consumer understands the real economic 
consequences (the financial burden) of the clauses in question. In 
addition to the foregoing, the judgment does not give retroactive 
validity to the annulment of the floor clauses.
BOX 2.2FLOOR CLAUSES IN MORTGAGE LOANS TO CONSUMERS: LEGAL RULINGS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES
Moreover, it should not be forgotten that, if the risk of a revaluation of assets indicated in 
Chapter 1 materialises through a sudden rise in long-term interest rates, institutions may 
have losses in their trading book and write-downs on available-for-sale assets. However, an 
increase in the slope of the yield curve may benefit deposit institutions in the medium term.
Recently, an additional risk for the income statement of institutions is in the form of various 
court judgments that have translated into an increase in the legal costs incurred by banks, 
obliging them to make additional provisions, with the consequent negative effect on their 
income, which demonstrates the importance of legal risk for Spanish deposit institutions 
(see Box 2.2).
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Although it is still early to make a quantitative assessment of the future impact that this risk 
may have, institutions can be expected to adjust their loan approval and pricing criteria, 
which will possibly have an impact on the supply of credit.
In line with the above remarks on the cost-to-income ratio, capacity adjustment through 
reductions in employees and offices continues, as seen in Chart 2.22.A. Meanwhile, the level 
of concentration in the Spanish banking sector has increased, but, as seen in Chart 2.22.B, it 
remains low relative to other European banking systems. As a result, there is still room for 
institutions to consider possible corporate operations, with potential attendant efficiency 
gains, which would contribute to addressing with a greater guarantee of success the pressures 
on profitability in the Spanish banking sector.
Additionally, traditional banking business is facing the challenge posed by the development 
of new technologies and by new entrants, called FinTechs. More specifically, it is facing 
BBVA, S.A., and Banco Popular Español, S.A.), concluded that the 
non-retroactivity of the nullity declared by the Supreme Court in its 
above-mentioned Judgment of 9 May 2013 is contrary to European 
law. Therefore, the courts which had raised the questions referred 
for a preliminary ruling must, for decisions to be given in the main 
proceedings, refrain from applying the case-law of the Supreme 
Court which had limited the retroactivity of the declaration of 
unfairness in respect of the floor clauses.
As a result of the above-mentioned decision, on 21 January 2017 
Royal Decree-Law 1/2017 of 20 January 2017 on urgent measures 
to protect consumers as regards floor clauses was published in 
the Official State Gazette. This Royal Decree-Law has set up a 
channel to make it easier for consumers to reach an agreement 
with credit institutions and thus settle disputes arising from the 
CJEU’s judgment, without resorting to judicial means. The 
recognition of the principle of retroactivity in respect of the 
declaration of nullity of floor clauses has sought to organise the 
process of refunding amounts wrongfully earned by credit 
institutions applying the floor clauses in order to avoid the courts 
from being saturated by possible lawsuits filed by the mortgagors 
concerned.
The various judgments handed down on floor clauses have 
prompted institutions to decide to refrain from applying them or to 
set aside provisions to cover any contingencies, on a case-by-case 
basis, which might arise. In particular, the CJEU’s judgment 
annulling the limitation on retroactivity has compelled institutions to 
record additional provisions of around €1,900 million in their 2016 
income statements. This amount, which was calculated by banks 
based on their experience of customer claims and the degree of 
transparency of their floor clauses and which has been reviewed by 
their external auditors, demonstrates the impact of legal risk on 
banks’ profitability and, consequently, on the need for this risk to 
be properly monitored, managed and provisioned.
In the wake of this court decision, on 25 June 2013 the Banco de 
España sent a letter to the professional associations of the banking 
sector (AEB, CECA and UNACC) requesting they convey to their 
respective members the need to review whether the floor clauses 
in their outstanding mortgage loans conformed to the transparency 
standards laid down by the above-mentioned Judgment 241/2013 
of 9 May 2013 delivered by the Civil Division of the Supreme Court. 
The letter further stated that banks should henceforth take all due 
care when selling mortgage loans that included this type of clause, 
adhering in particular to the information requirements of the 
above-mentioned Transparency Order and of Banco de España 
Circular 5/2012 of 27 June 2012 implementing this order and to 
the criteria laid down by the above-mentioned judgment.
Subsequently, the Civil Division of the Supreme Court has ruled 
again on the unfair nature of floor clauses in several decisions in 
response to individual and collective actions. Noteworthy among 
these decisions is Judgment 139/2015 of 25 March 2015 (which, in 
the case of an individual action brought against BBVA, established 
the case-law that the declaration of floor clauses to be null and void 
does not have retroactive effect) and Judgment 705/2015 of 23 
December 2015 (in the case of a collective action filed against BBVA 
and Banco Popular), which inter alia, reaffirmed that the floor clauses 
included in loan agreements entered into with consumers were null 
and void. Also worth highlighting due to its importance is the 
Judgment of Madrid Commercial Court No. 11 of 7 April 2016 which 
declared that the floor clauses included in the loan agreements of 
more than forty financial institutions were null and void and ordered 
the institutions to remove these clauses and refund the amounts 
wrongfully charged since 9 May 2013 to the consumers affected.
Finally, the Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) (Grand Chamber) of 21 December 2016 (relating to 
questions referred for preliminary rulings during the hearing of 
various proceedings brought against Cajasur Banco, S.A.U., 
FLOOR CLAUSES IN MORTGAGE LOANS TO CONSUMERS: LEGAL RULINGS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES (cont´d) BOX 2.2
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the challenge of the technological transformation of banking which affects the way in 
which certain banking services are supplied and used. These innovations (including the 
use of different mobile devices, the processing of large amounts of information very 
rapidly -big data- and new technologies for processing information remotely or “in the 
cloud”) represent an alternative to the possibility of continuing to improve efficiency and 
offer new or higher quality services to customers. However, it should not be forgotten that 
the benefits of using new technologies do not come without costs or risks. These costs 
arise from the investments needed in innovation and risks related to data privacy, fraud 
and cyber-attacks.
This context of profitability under pressure, as well as the uncertainty of regulatory 
requirements and the limited growth in European economies, have affected developments 
in the share prices of banks. Thus, in the first half of the year their stock market performance 
was unfavourable, although from the summer banking sector stock indices of the main 
European countries began to recover. That said, differences are observed in behaviour 
across countries, and the performance of the Spanish banking system was more favourable 
than that of other banking systems, such as the German one and in particular, the Italian 
one. In the first two months of 2017 share prices have remained relatively stable and since 
the beginning of March have been rising, especially in the last few days (see Chart 2.23.A). 
The net result of this fall, subsequent recovery and rise has been an increase in the price 
to book value ratio of the Spanish banking system relative to the beginning of 2016, which 
Stock indices for the main 
European banking sectors 
recovered from summer 2016
SOURCES: Banco de España and European Central Bank.
a? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
EMPLOYEES AND BRANCHES. EUROPEAN COMPARISON
Business in Spain, ID
CHART 2.22
 25,000
 29,000
 33,000
 37,000
 41,000
 45,000
 49,000
150,000
175,000
200,000
225,000
250,000
275,000
300,000
Dec-00 Dec-02 Dec-04 Dec-06 Dec-08 Dec-10 Dec-12 Dec-14 Dec-16
EMPLOYEES BRANCHES (right-hand scale)
A  NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES AND BRANCHES
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
4,500
DE LU AT GB IT FR PL IE RO SE HU ES BG CZ BE LV SI PT DK SK HR CY MT LT NL GR EE FI
2007 2015
B  EUROPEAN COMPARISON OF THE HERFINDAHL-HIRSCHMAN INDEX IN TERMS OF ASSETS (a)
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 49 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, MAY 2017
currently stands at a notable level among its European peers (see Chart 2.23.B). In any 
event, the continuing low profitability of the sector relative to the cost of capital employed, 
certain specific elements of particular banking systems and financial institutions, such as 
the high level of non-interest earning assets on bank balance sheets, as well as the 
uncertainty associated with regulatory changes in the sector, remain potential elements of 
risk with a direct effect of downward correction on stock market prices.
Turning to an analysis of the solvency of Spanish deposit institutions as a whole, common 
equity tier 1, the highest quality capital, stood at a ratio of 12.8% in December 2016. 
During the year, the ratio rose slightly (16 bp; see Chart 2.24) and stood above the 
regulatory requirement.10 Likewise, the total capital and tier 1 capital ratios also increased, 
by 25 bp and 35 bp respectively during 2016. The total capital ratio stood at 14.7% in 
December 2016, while the tier 1 capital ratio reached 13% (0.2 pp above CET1).
As seen in Chart 2.25.A, which shows the levels of the various types of capital and the 
volume of risk exposure (risk weighted assets, RWAs), the increase in the ratios resulted 
from the decline in RWAs, since capital levels remained relatively stable during 2016. 
10   The phase-in of the capital conservation buffer began in 2016, which raised by 0.625% the minimum CET1 
requirement of 4.5%.
2.3 Solvency
The CET1 ratio stood at 
12.8% in December 2016, 
after increasing slightly over 
the year
The increase was due to the 
decline in risk weighted assets
SOURCE: Datastream.
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RWAs stood at €1,647 billion at the end of 2016, a decline of 1.9%. Given that the total 
assets of deposit institutions also fell by a similar magnitude (1.7%) last year, RWAs hardly 
changed as a percentage of total assets during 2016, standing at 45.7%.
Chart 2.25.B shows the composition of own funds (the numerator of the capital ratios). As 
usual, CET1 accounts for the vast majority of own funds (87%), additional tier 1 capital 
(which is included in tier 1 capital but not in CET1) represents 1% of own funds. Finally, 
tier 2 capital (included in total capital but not eligible as tier 1 capital) has a weight of 12% 
in own funds.
Focusing on CET1, Chart 2.25.C gives a breakdown of its composition in terms of RWAs. 
As regards eligible capital, equity instruments are the main component (44%), followed by 
reserves (34%), transitional adjustments (12%), and minority interests and other (9%). As 
can be seen, capital and reserves account for practically 80% of CET1. As for deductions, 
most arise from goodwill and other intangible assets (64%), while those arising from 
deferred tax assets and other deductions account for 18% in each case.
As regards the composition of risk weighted assets, the denominator of the ratios is made 
up largely by credit and counterparty risk (87%), followed by operational risk (9%), while 
position, foreign exchange and commodity and other risks account for the remaining 4% 
of RWAs (see Chart 2.25.D).
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accounted for by credit risk
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In keeping with the analysis in the probability section, Chart 2.26 shows, for the solvency 
ratio, changes in the total capital ratio over a long time horizon, distinguishing the 
contribution of the numerator (total capital) from that of the denominator (RWAs). In the 
early years of the 21st century the total capital ratio remained relatively stable, since the 
notable increases in capital were offset by similar increases in RWAs, with notable 
growth in lending to the private sector. Thus, between 2000 and 2007 the total capital 
ratio increased by barely 0.1 pp, from 10.5% to 10.6%, as a consequence of the sharp 
increase in capital and exposure. During the next few years there was an increase in the 
total capital ratio, as a result of the decline in RWAs (due to private sector deleveraging), 
since the total capital fell (due to the losses of the sector). The total capital ratio increased 
by 2.6 pp, to 13.2% in 2013. Between 2013 and 2015 the total capital ratio continued to 
rise, by 1.2 pp to 14.5%, but this increase resulted from a change in the numerator rather 
than in the denominator. The ratio strengthened as a result of the increase in total capital 
and despite the increase, albeit to a lesser extent, in RWAs. Finally, in 2016, as mentioned 
at the beginning of the section, there was a slight increase in the ratio due to the decline 
in RWAs.
The change in capital over the period 2000-2016 was partly the result of the change in the 
retained earnings of institutions and, also, of changes in the level of capital itself (increases 
and reductions resulting from bail-ins). Over this period, at the aggregate level, Spanish 
institutions have maintained a relatively stable dividend (or transfers to the social welfare 
fund or payments to cooperative members in the case of savings banks and cooperatives, 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a An increase (decrease) in capital depicted in green (red) causes an increase in the total capital ratio, whereas an increase (decrease) in risk-weighted assets 
depicted in red (green) causes a reduction of total capital ratio.
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respectively) policy, except between 2012 and 2014. Thus, the percentage of distributable 
income paid in dividends, to the social welfare fund or to cooperative members stood on 
average somewhat below 50%. Chart 2.27 shows developments at the aggregate level as 
a percentage of eligible own funds for total deposit institutions.
A comparative analysis of the CET1 ratio, with respect to the other EU countries, shows 
(see Chart 2.28.A) that Spain’s ratio is relatively low, although not far (1.6 pp) from the 
European average. In terms of the leverage ratio, i.e. without including risk weightings, the 
relative position of the Spanish banking sector improves (see Chart 2.28.B).
Box 2.3 seeks to explain the differences in the risk levels included in RWA calculations, 
presenting a comparative analysis for the main European countries of the extent of use of 
the standardised approach (SA) and the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach, as well as 
of RWA density under the IRB approach.
Spain’s CET1 ratio 
is relatively low with respect 
to its European peers
SOURCE: European Banking Authority.
a? ????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????? ??????????? ??????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?
SOLVENCY MEASURES. EUROPEAN COMPARISON. DECEMBER 2016 CHART 2.28
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
EE FI SE LU LT HR SI BG LV IE CZ GR DK RO NO SK BE PL CY MT NL DE GB HU AT FR ES IT PT
%
A  CET1 RATIO
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
EE HR GR BG SI PL IE CY LV RO LT NO HU SK MT DK PT AT ES FI GB LU BE FR DE SE IT NL
EU AVERAGE
%
B  LEVERAGE RATIO (a)
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 53 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, MAY 2017
The results of the 2016 EU-wide transparency exercise performed 
on the banking sector and published by the EBA in December 
20161 give continuity to the analysis of the main European banks’ 
loan portfolios which was performed in the May 2015 FSR and 
updated in the May 2016 FSR. The comparison of the information 
from this exercise with that also published by the EBA in the 2014 
stress test exercise provides the opportunity to analyse changes in 
credit exposures and their risk weightings between December 
2013 and June 2016 for a homogeneous sample of 68 institutions 
located in the main European economies: Germany (18), Spain (14), 
France (11), Great Britain (4), Italy (15) and the Netherlands (6).
The analyses performed in the 2015 and 2016 FSR showed 
significant cross-country differences in how intensively the 
standardised approach (SA) and the internal-ratings based (IRB) 
approach are used by banks when they determine the RWAs of 
their loan portfolios. Similarly, these exercises revealed notable 
differences in the resulting RWA densities – measured as the ratio 
of the risk assessment of credit exposures to total credit exposure 
value – both across countries and in terms of the approach used. 
The analysis presented in this box confirms that the differences 
observed in previous years persisted as at June 2016.
1 Credit risk composition
Chart A shows the relative share of the various portfolios which 
make up the total credit exposure of the banks analysed: central 
governments and central banks, institutions, corporates, retail, 
secured by mortgages on real estate property and other.
As seen in the chart, the highest percentages of exposures for the 
aggregate of the six countries considered relate to the following 
portfolios: corporates (30%), central governments and central 
banks (24%, up 4 pp from 2013) and secured by mortgages on 
real estate property (21%). For Spanish banks, the secured by 
mortgages on real estate property portfolio represents 30% of 
total exposure – putting Spain at the head of the sample countries, 
behind the Netherlands but notably above average – whereas the 
corporates portfolio represents 23%, 7 pp below the average of 
the banks considered.
BOX 2.3RISK WEIGHTING OF CREDIT EXPOSURES: ANALYSIS OF EUROPEAN BANKS
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1  The results of the 2016 transparency exercise are available on the 
EBA’s website http://www.eba.europa.eu/risk-analysis-and-data/eu-
wide-transparency-exercise/2016/results.
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RISK WEIGHTING OF CREDIT EXPOSURES: ANALYSIS OF EUROPEAN BANKS (cont´d) BOX 2.3
3 RWA density under the standardised and IRB approaches for 
private-sector portfolios
In view of the importance of the IRB approach in assessing the 
credit risk of private-sector portfolios, it is important to analyse the 
risk weightings arising from the use of this approach in the various 
countries.
3.1 Corporates
As shown in Chart B, as at June 2016, 80% of the exposures in the 
corporates portfolio of all the banks considered are subject to the 
IRB approach. In Spain, the proportion in which each methodology 
is used is relatively more balanced with 65% using IRB compared 
with 35% using the SA.
The RWA density of the corporate portfolio subject to IRB at 
aggregate level stands at 47% as at June 2016 compared with an 
average density of 88% for the exposures under the SA (see 
Chart C). By country (see Chart D), the densities of the IRB 
2 Credit exposures under the standardised and IRB approaches
Chart B includes changes, at aggregate level and by loan portfolio, 
in the percentage of exposures whose risk is measured using the 
standardised or IRB approaches. As shown in the chart, the 
exposure measured by applying the IRB approach as at June 2016 
for the aggregate of the six countries constituting the sample 
represents 65% of total exposure (64% in 2013). For Spain, 
exposure under the IRB approach as at June 2016 represents 
44% of total exposure (the same as in 2013) and it is the country 
where the IRB approach is used least intensively. At the opposite 
end of the scale are the Netherlands which should be noted for 
their high use of the IRB approach that represents 86% of total 
exposure (85% in 2013).
The analysis of the intensity of use of the standardised and IRB 
approaches for banks’ various loan portfolios underlines the 
importance of the IRB approach in the risk assessment of private-
sector portfolios (corporates, retail and secured by mortgages on 
real estate property).
88   
47   
71   
30   
41   
15   
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
SA IRB SA IRB SA IRB
Corporates Retail Secured by mortgages
on real estate property
Chart C  
STANDARDISED AND IRB DENSITIES BY COUNTRY. JUNE 2016
%
44   41   
56 57
48   47   53 52 47   46   43   42   
48   47   
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
13 16 13 16 13 16 13 16 13 16 13 16 13 16
DE ES FR GB IT NL Total
Chart D  
DENSITIES UNDER THE IRB APPROACH. CORPORATES PORTFOLIO
%
29 28
46   45   
22 24   
45   
39
21 24   
39 39
30 30
0
10
20
30
40
50
13 16 13 16 13 16 13 16 13 16 13 16 13 16
DE ES FR GB IT NL Total
Chart E  
DENSITIES UNDER THE IRB APPROACH. RETAIL PORTFOLIO
%
16 15
19 17
15 15
21
15 14   
17
15 14   
17 15
0
10
20
30
13 16 13 16 13 16 13 16 13 16 13 16 13 16
DE ES FR GB IT NL Total
Chart F  
DENSITIES UNDER THE IRB APPROACH. SECURED BY MORTGAGES ON REAL 
ESTATE PROPERTIES PORTFOLIO
%
SOURCE: European Banking Authority.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 55 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, MAY 2017
BOX 2.3RISK WEIGHTING OF CREDIT EXPOSURES: ANALYSIS OF EUROPEAN BANKS (cont´d)
case Spain’s intensity of use of the IRB approach is below the 
European average, with 65% of total exposures subject to this 
approach as at June 2016.
In aggregate terms, the density of exposures in IRB as at June 
2016 is 15% compared with a density in SA of 41% (see Chart C). 
The analysis for the different countries considered (see Chart F) 
reveals that Spain also has a higher density in IRB for this portfolio, 
which stands at 17% (19% in 2013).
In short, the analysis presented highlights the persistence of 
significant differences both in relation to the intensity of use of the 
standardised and IRB approaches across countries and as regards 
the densities resulting from the two approaches. Furthermore, as 
at June 2016, there continues to be significant cross-country 
dispersion in RWAs densities resulting from the IRB approaches 
used by the banks.
This variability in RWA density under the IRB approach has been 
noted repeatedly2 by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS) as one of the main sources of heterogeneous risk 
assessment by banks in different jurisdictions. The proposals to 
mitigate this lack of comparability include, most notably, limiting 
the use of IRB approaches to certain portfolios as well as applying 
minimum floors to the reduction of capital requirements under the 
IRB approach as compared with the SA. With regard to the latter 
point, the BCBS has still not been able to reach a final agreement 
of the amount of these floors.
approach range from 41% in Germany to 57% in Spain, a similar 
range to that as at December 2013 (from 43% in the Netherlands 
to 56% in Spain) which places Spain in the position of the country 
with the highest density in terms of IRB for this portfolio.
3.2 Retail
As shown in Chart B, as at June 2016 the volume of exposures of 
the retail portfolio subject to the IRB approach for all sample 
countries is practically double the volume under the SA. Spain 
stands out, in particular, among the sample of countries analysed 
since its proportion of exposures in the retail portfolio subject to 
the IRB approach (36%) is notably lower than that of the exposures 
under the SA.
The RWA density resulting from the IRB approach for all the banks 
analysed stands at 30% as at June 2016 (the same density as in 
2013), compared with a density of 71% for the exposures of this 
portfolio valued using the SA (Chart C).
Chart E includes the RWA density under the IRB approach for the 
different countries in the sample, among which Spain is once 
again noteworthy, with a density in IRB of 45% (46% in 2013), 15 
pp above the average and more than 20 pp higher than the 
densities of France and Italy.
3.3 Secured by mortgages on real estate property
The importance of the IRB approach is also underlined in the 
portfolio of loans secured by mortgages on real estate property 
with an intensity of use of 84% compared with 16% under the SA 
for the countries analysed, as a whole (see Chart B). Also in this 
2  See, for example, the consultative document, «Reducing variation in credit 
risk-weighted assets – constraints on the use of internal model approaches», 
BIS, 24 June 2016; https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d362.pdf.
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3  ANALYSIS AND MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY
The latest update of the systemic risk map developed by the Banco de España1 suggests 
a continuation of the moderate easing in vulnerabilities over recent quarters (see Chart 3.1). 
Among other reasons, this development is due to the reduction in risks relating to the real 
economy (change in GDP, unemployment rate), which have improved substantially over the 
past year. 
Currently, three indicators stand at levels of some risk. The first refers to the measure 
reflecting the NPL ratio and recourse to Eurosystem financing. Both these variables are 
still at higher levels than their respective historical averages, although the situation of 
recourse to the Eurosystem, within a conventional and non-conventional monetary policy 
context, has improved on its 2012 levels. Risks also persist in terms of the concentration 
of credit portfolios, which would be attributable to structural factors that change gradually. 
In any event, in these two categories, which continue to reflect the effects of the last crisis, 
there has been a progressive lessening of risk in recent years. Lastly, the vulnerabilities 
relating to financial markets also remain in place, albeit at low levels. Here, the volatility of 
bank securities and the changes in corporate debt spreads during the last quarter for 
which data are available are expected to have prevented any improvement. That said, it 
should be pointed out that the level of risk detected for each of these three categories is 
similar to that noted in the previous FSR. 
Despite the favourable behaviour of certain real variables, credit continued falling, meaning 
it is far from posing a situation of risk. For this reason, the Banco de España has decided 
to keep the rate of the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) applicable to domestic credit 
1  This tool transforms the information from over 100 indicators relating to key variables for the financial system into 
a risk map. Specifically, measures on credit, the housing market, the structure of credit institutions’ balance 
sheets (liquidity risk, concentration of the credit portfolio and NPLs), the situation of financial markets and the 
real economy.
3.1  Analysis of 
systemic risks
In the past year there 
was a moderate reduction 
in systemic risks
3.2  Cyclical risks and 
macroprudential 
decisions 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The heat map levels are shown graphically in seven categories. The credit risk groups together indicators on the changes in and degree of imbalance of total and 
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exposures at 0% since its entry into force in 2016.2 The CCyB is the main macroprudential 
instrument for addressing the build-up of cyclical risks. The decision is consistent with the 
diagnosis of the position of the credit cycle and is underpinned by a framework of “guided 
discretion” for the CCyB, in which the level of this instrument is determined by means of 
the analysis of various quantitative indicators, as well as by expert judgement and the 
analysis of qualitative information. 
Among the quantitative indicators, the credit-to-GDP gap, defined as the difference 
between the credit-to-GDP ratio and its long-term or equilibrium level, is the main reference,3 
for two reasons. First, because this is the metric proposed by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS) to guide the setting of the CCyB, as well as the fact it is 
incorporated into current European and Spanish legislation4. Second, because it enables 
the behaviour of trend cycle-adjusted credit to be taken into account, which contributes to 
identifying periods of low growth or a decline in credit (the gap narrows and may even turn 
negative), with other periods of moderately or excessively increasing lending activity (the 
2  See http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/GAP/Secciones/SalaPrensa/NotasInformativas/17/presbe2017_19en.pdf.
3  The Banco de España monitors other indicators as guidance for the CCyB, such as house prices, debt service 
and the current account balance. All these indicators reinforce the decision to hold the CCyB at 0%. 
4  Directive 2013/36/EU (CRD IV), Law 10/2014, Royal Decree 84/2015 and Banco de España Circular 2/2016.
The position of the credit cycle 
does not advise a tightening 
of macroprudential policy 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The shaded area shows the last period of systemic banking crisis (2009 Q2-2013 Q4).
b The credit-to-GDP gap is the difference between the credit-to-GDP ratio and the trend.
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the credit-to-GDP gap.
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gap widens) relative to a theoretical long-term equilibrium level. The latest observation of 
this gap places it at –60.6 pp, far below levels that would advise the activation of the 
CCyB.5 Charts 3.2.A and 3.2.B reflect the behaviour of the level of the gap, along with the 
credit-to-GDP ratio and its trend, for an extensive time horizon. 
From the macroprudential standpoint, it is worth addressing not only the level of the gap, 
but also the changes in it and the determinants of these changes. In this respect, since late 
2015 some stabilisation of the gap has been observed for the first time since the start of 
the crisis. To analyse this novel development and, in general, the dynamics of the gap over 
different phases of the cycle, the changes in its various components are broken down and 
its path is studied. The exercise is depicted in Chart 3.2.C, which shows the year-on-year 
change in the credit-to-GDP gap on the basis of the contributions of the change in GDP, 
of credit (distinguishing between credit to households and to non-financial corporations) 
and of the trend. 
In the years immediately prior to the financial crisis, credit activity expanded sharply, 
meaning that it is the components of credit, both to households and to firms, that account 
for the increase in the gap. GDP and the trend, for their part, contribute to narrowing the 
gap; in the first instance, owing to the increase in economic activity and, in the case of the 
trend component, to the very inertia of this variable. 
In the early years of the crisis, on the contrary, the roles of GDP and credit in respect of the 
change in the gap were inverted. Specifically, credit diminishes, which exerts downward 
pressure on the gap. At the same time, the decline in GDP neutralises, in part, the foregoing 
effect. The contribution of the trend, however, is scarcely affected, since it continues to 
reflect the inertia of the expansion years. The latter factor leads the gap to narrow sharply, 
to the point of attaining very negative levels, in keeping with more restrictive macrofinancial 
conditions. 
The situation starts to change as the recovery begins. The trend, which incorporates to a 
greater extent the behaviour of credit during the crisis years, begins to fall, and its 
contribution to the change in the gap turns positive. As to the other variables, GDP 
contributes negatively once more, in step with the return to economic growth. Finally, the 
negative contribution of credit diminishes as the contraction in credit activity eases. The 
combination of these elements gives rise to slight increases in the value of the gap, 
although its level continues in very negative territory, as indicated. 
Two conclusions may be drawn from the foregoing. The first is that the adoption of the 
credit-to-GDP gap as an indicator for monitoring the economy is highly informative in 
terms of the identification of systemic risks, both in expansionary phases (increasingly 
positive gap, possible tightening of macroprudential policy) and in crisis episodes (fall in 
the gap, possible adoption of measures to ease/release macroprudential instruments). In 
particular, the changes in the level of the gap provide significant information, as does its 
very level, for macroprudential analysis. The second conclusion is that the recent turning 
point in the gap may prove durable, essentially owing to the adjustment of the trend 
component.6 That said, it will be difficult to witness a strong recovery in the gap should the 
current contained course of bank credit continue. 
5  The Banco de España, in accordance with BCBS guidelines, considers a level of 2 pp as the reference point for 
a possible activation of the CCyB. 
6  If the trend is interpreted as a theoretical or equilibrium level of credit in relation to GDP, the current adjustment 
of this component might reflect structural changes in the Spanish economy’s debt after the last crisis. 
The correction of the credit-
to-GDP gap might be gradual 
if credit holds on its current 
contained course 
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The identification and designation of systemically important banking institutions are carried 
out annually following a series of procedures and methodologies coordinated at the global 
and EU level, in conformity with the national regulations that entrust this task to the Banco 
de España. In November 2016 the Banco de España approved its latest annual revision, 
publishing7 a list of six Spanish banks designated as being of domestic systemic importance 
for the year 2017. The list includes an indication of the additional capital buffers with which 
these banks must comply until 2019, at which time the transition period for the implementation 
of this macroprudential requirement concludes (see Table 3.1). 
One of the banks designated (Santander) will continue to have a dual status of Global 
Systemically Important Institution (G-SII) and that of Other Systemically Important Institution 
(O-SII ), and it will have to meet, this year, a supplementary CET1 capital requirement of 0.5% 
of its total risk exposure on a consolidated basis. Another five banks (BBVA, Caixabank, 
Bankia, Sabadell and Popular) will be considered as O-SIIs and will be required to have 
capital buffers in the range of 0.125% and 0.375% in 2017.
As regards the O-SIIs identification exercise of the previous year, it should be noted that 
there have been no significant changes in the level of systemic importance of the banks 
designated. However, the associated capital surcharges have been partly amended as a 
result of the application by the Banco de España of a new calibration of these capital 
buffer-related requirements, consistent with the ECB’s new criteria for O-SIIs in the euro 
area. This revision has given rise to a gradual increase of 0.25 pp in the buffers applicable 
to three of these banks (BBVA, Sabadell and Popular) up to 2019.
Finally, the Banco de España announced in December 2016 the designation of one 
institution (Santander) as a G-SII8 for the year 2018. Hence, and as far as Spanish banks 
are concerned, the Banco de España has adopted the latest resolution of the Financial 
Stability Board (FSB) on G-SIIs,9 in line with the regulatory terms established and with the 
habitual practices of peer central banks and supervisory authorities. For greater details on 
this identification of systemic institutions, see Box 3.1. 
7  See http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/GAP/Secciones/SalaPrensa/ComunicadosBCE/NotasInformativasBCE/16/Arc/
Fic/presbe2016_50en.pdf.
8  See http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/GAP/Secciones/SalaPrensa/NotasInformativas/16/Arc/Fic/presbe2016_58en.pdf.
9  See the FSB’s communication dated 21 November 2016: “2016 list of global systemically important banks (G-SIBs)”. 
The identification made by the FSB in 2016 has consequences in terms of capital buffers from 1 January 2018. As is 
its usual practice, the FSB makes the announcement each year in November, allowing approximately 14 months 
beforehand to smooth implementation. 
3.3  Systemically 
important institutions 
Six institutions of national 
systemic importance have 
been identified for 2017, 
one of which is also of global 
systemic importance 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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SYTEMICALLY IMPORTANT INSTITUTIONS IN 2017 TABLE 3.1
At the request of the G20, in November 2011 the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB) published a set of measures2 to address specific risks 
posed by systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) 
which, against the backdrop of the 2008 financial crisis, were 
considered “too big to fail” by the different authorities responsible 
for their supervision. In addition to this publication, the FSB issued 
an initial list of global systemically important banks (G-SIBs), using 
a methodological framework3 developed by the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision (BCBS) which establishes supplementary 
capital requirements for institutions identified as systemic. The 
Banco de España, which is a member of the BCBS and the FSB, 
has participated actively in G-SIBs identification exercises.
In 2012 the BCBS also published a similar methodological framework 
under which the treatment applicable to G-SIBs is extended to other 
banking institutions whose systemic importance is restricted to the 
domestic domain. These institutions are referred to as domestic 
systemically important banks (D-SIBs)4 and their identification is left 
to the discretion of each national jurisdiction.
In the European Union, Directive 2013/36/EU on capital requirements 
for credit institutions (CRD IV, transposed into Spanish law 
through Law 10/2014, Royal Decree 84/2015 and Banco de España 
Circular 2/2016) endorses the concepts of G-SIB as global 
systemically important institution (G-SII) and of D-SIB as other 
systemically important institution (O-SII) and entrusts the European 
Banking Authority with drafting the technical standards and 
guidelines in accordance with the frameworks developed by the 
Basel Committee5 to identify these institutions. 
Conceptually, systemically important institutions are those institutions 
whose failure or malfunction may trigger a shock causing serious 
damage to the financial system and the real economy, therefore 
meriting stricter prudential treatment than that of other institutions. 
For this reason, specific capital surcharges (buffers) are introduced 
for these institutions depending on whether they are considered 
systemically important globally (G-SII) and/or domestically or 
nationally (O-SII). 
G-SIIs are identified by using a methodology of indicators based 
on the main features of institutions classed under five categories: 
a) size, b) interconnectedness with the financial system; c) 
substitutability of the services or the financial infrastructure 
provided; d) complexity; and e) cross-border activity. Twelve 
indicators are aggregated to obtain a final score (each of the 
aforementioned five categories has the same weight in the 
calculation of this score). The methodology produces a ranking 
of institutions. Those with a score of more than 130 bp are 
automatically identified as a G-SII while those with a score that is 
lower than, although relatively near to, the cut-off point, may be 
identified as a G-SII at the discretion of the relevant authority (which 
may resort to using supervisory expert judgment). Institutions 
scoring above this threshold are assigned, on the basis of their 
score, to one of the four sub-categories (“buckets”) established by 
the methodology, each of which has assigned a CET1 surcharge 
ranging between 1.0% and 2.5 % of their risk exposure.
The implementation of capital surcharges on G-SIIs commenced 
in 2016 and is phased in over a three-year period, so that 25% of 
the buffer assigned is covered in 2016, 50% in 2017, 75% in 2018 
and the whole of it as from 1 January 2019. At present only one 
Spanish institution is identified as a G-SII (Santander) and is 
subject to a surcharge of 1.00% in 2019 (0.50% in 2017).
Likewise, the Banco de España is responsible for identifying 
O-SIIs using EBA guidelines on this matter.6 The methodology for 
identification of O-SIIs is based on generic quantitative criteria, 
together with a certain degree of discretion for adjustment to the 
specificities of the local banking system. Every O-SII identified is 
required to maintain a capital buffer, of up to 2% at most of its risk 
exposure, to be determined by the Banco de España. 
EBA guidelines on the identification of O-SIIs propose a scoring 
system for the degree of systemic importance of institutions by 
means of the aggregation of a set of ten indicators that reflect the 
size, importance, complexity and the degree of interconnectedness 
of the institutions. Institutions with a score of over 350 bp should 
be automatically identified as O-SIIs. 
O-SIIs have been identified annually since 2015 (for 2016) and 
the associated capital surcharge schedule (similar to that used 
for G-SIIs) is phased-in between 2016 and 2019, pursuant to 
Spanish regulations. Designation as O-SIIs for each year must 
be announced no later than 1 December of the preceding year.
For 2017, the Banco de España has revised the calibration of 
buffers for O-SIIs in order to adapt to the new methodology 
stipulated by the ECB7 with which it seeks to harmonise the 
minimum capital buffers applicable to O-SIIs within the scope of 
the Single Supervisory Mechanism. Specifically, the Banco de 
España has established four levels of constant capital buffers at 
BOX 3.1IDENTIFICATION OF SYSTEMIC INSTITUTIONS1
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1  The November 2014 FSR (Box 2.4) includes an initial description of the 
process of identifying global systemically important institutions and of 
the applicable capital surcharges.
2  FSB, Policy Measures to Address Systemically Important Financial 
Institutions, 4 November 2011.
3  BCBS, Global systemically important banks: assessment methodology and 
the higher loss absorbency requirement, November 2011, (subsequently 
updated in July 2013).
4  BCBS, A framework for dealing with domestic systemically important banks, 
October 2012.
5  For G-SIIs: Delegated Regulation (EU) 1222/2014, supplementing Directive 
2013/36/EU with regard to regulatory technical standards for the specification 
of the methodology for the identification of G-SIIs and for the definition of 
subcategories of G-SIIs. Implementing Regulation (EU) 1030/2014, laying 
down implementing technical standards with regard to the uniform formats 
and date for the disclosure of the values used to identify G-SIIs according to 
Regulation (EU) 575/2013. EBA Guidelines on the specification of indicators 
used to identify G-SIIs and their disclosure (EBA/GL/2014/02, subsequently 
revised through guidelines EBA/GL/2016/01).
6  EBA guidelines on the criteria to determine the conditions of application 
of Article 131(3) of Directive 2013/36/EU in relation to the assessment of 
O-SIIs (EBA/GL/2014/10).
7  See the Annex Governing Council Statement on Macroprudential Policies, 
ECB press release of 15 December 2016.
BOX 3.1IDENTIFICATION OF SYSTEMIC INSTITUTIONS (cont’d)
requirements for three institutions: BBVA (from 0.50% to 0.75%), 
Sabadell and Popular (from 0% to 0.25% in both cases), while 
there have been no changes for the other institutions (Santander, 
Caixabank and Bankia).
In the particular case of Santander (classified as both a G-SII and 
an O-SII), in accordance with the applicable regulations, only the 
higher of the two capital buffers is applicable. Since the two 
buffers are of the same level in this case, the surcharge requirement 
for this institution in 2017 is 0.50% (1.00% in 2019).
pre-established scoring intervals (tranches). Starting with a capital 
buffer of 0.25% in the first bucket, each successive bucket has 
a capital requirement which is 0.25 pp higher than the one 
immediately before, the maximum capital requirement being 1%, 
as detailed in Table A. 
Although there have been no noteworthy changes, with respect to 
the previous exercise, in the level of systemic importance of the 
six institutions designated as O-SIIs for 2017, the new calibration 
has given rise to a gradual increase of 0.25 pp in the buffer 
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QUANTIFICATION OF CAPITAL BUFFERS FOR OTHER SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT INSTITUTIONS (O-SIIs)
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4 ANNEX
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Difference between funds received in liquidity-providing operations and funds delivered in absorbing operations.
b Difference calculated in basis points.
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